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Human and civil rights organizations have long used litigation in an attempt to advance a particular 
cause, to bolster a certain right, or to bring about social change. A prominent example is strategic 
litigation filed on behalf of minority groups–including national and indigenous minorities. Such cases 
typically seek remedies from the government or public institutions due to discrimination or neglect 
experienced by minorities, or stemming from limitations on their ability to express or enjoy their culture 
and practices. In many cases, however, litigation fails or only partially succeeds in creating the kind of 
sustainable, widespread, and group-based change that the petitioners seek.   
Focusing on Israel and the Palestinian-Arab minority, which constitutes nearly one-fifth of the country's 
population, this Article explores the limitations and shortcomings of litigation as a strategy for obtaining 
collective rights. The Article examines three different kinds of collective rights that Palestinian-Arab 
petitioners have attempted to achieve through legal action in Israel: the right to political representation (in 
decision-making bodies); linguistic rights (in public accommodation); and equitable (group-based) 
allocation of public resources. The significance of these rights for national minorities is explored, along 
with the specifics of each of the cases highlighted and their outcomes. 
This Article demonstrates that while the outcome of each legal case was a ‘success’–on a technical level–
the judgments failed to achieve the substantive equality and group-based rights that the petitioners sought. 
Worse still, some of the judgments actually may have led to setbacks. Accordingly, this article argues that 
litigation has thus far been an insufficient tool for protecting the collective rights of the Palestinian-Arab 
minority, as the courts have failed to draft meaningful and sustainable frameworks for action and 
enforcement into their judgments. The article concludes by suggesting that given the challenges and 
political and social constraints faced by national minorities in legal and other public spheres, the law is 
dependent on the will of the courts. Thus, the courts must view their role more broadly and take a more 
expansive–and perhaps even activist–approach in rendering its rulings.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Human and civil rights organizations have long used litigation to advance a particular cause, to 
bolster a certain right, or to bring about social change. A prominent example is strategic litigation filed 
on behalf of minority groups–including national and indigenous minorities. Such cases typically seek 
remedies from the government or public institutions due to various forms of discrimination or neglect 
experienced by minorities, or stemming from limitations on their ability to express or enjoy their culture 
and practices. In many cases, however, litigation fails or only partially succeeds in creating the kind of 
sustainable, widespread, and group-based change that the petitioners seek.   
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A number of factors can account for this lack of success. Rulings are often narrow in scope and 
application or lack sufficiently stringent penalties, which in turn render them ineffective deterrents 
against future violations of minority rights. Additionally, the judges are usually members of those in 
power within the societies they are asked to scrutinize, and thus may be unable to sympathize with the 
merits of the petitioners’ claims, or simply reluctant to change the prevailing political order. 
Furthermore, even when positive judgments with enforcement mechanisms are handed down, 
implementation is still dependent on the goodwill of political functionaries.1  
Focusing on the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, this Article will explore the limitations and 
shortcomings of litigation as a strategy for the realization of collective rights. Nearly 20% of citizens in 
Israel are Palestinian Arabs who are indigenous to the region.2 This Article will examine three different 
kinds of collective rights that Palestinian-Arab petitioners in Israel have attempted to achieve through 
legal action: the right to political representation (in decision-making bodies); linguistic rights (in public 
accommodation); and equitable (group-based) allocation of public resources. The significance of these 
rights for national minorities will be explored, along with the specifics of each of the cases highlighted 
and their outcomes.   
This Article will demonstrate that while the outcome of each legal case–on a technical level–was 
a “success”, the judgments failed to achieve the substantive equality and group-based rights that the 
petitioners sought. Worse still, some of the judgments actually may have led to setbacks. In each of the 
cases below, legal tools were employed and exhausted by and on behalf of the Palestinian-Arab minority, 
after other advocacy strategies failed to convince the relevant political functionaries to make the desired 
social change. Indeed, the prevailing social and political forces impeded positive change due to their lack 
of will and through the use of poor enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the outcomes were undesirable and 
the goal of reinforcing collective rights was unrealized. Accordingly, this Article argues that litigation in 
Israeli courts, thus far, has proven to be an insufficient tool for securing the Palestinian-Arab minority’s 
cultural and political rights in a substantive and sustainable way, particularly in cases where collective, 
rather than individual, rights are at stake.  
This Article will conclude by arguing that given the political and social challenges and constraints 
faced by national minorities in legal and other public spheres, the law is dependent on the will of the 
courts. Thus far, even when the Israeli courts have ruled in favor of Palestinian-Arab rights, the wording 
of the right supposedly defined or declared in the judgment was overly vague and lacked “teeth”, or a 
framework for enforcement, thereby leaving room for the State and its actors to evade the spirit of the 
rulings. Therefore, this Article will argue that the courts must view their role more broadly and take a 
more expansive–and perhaps even activist–approach in rendering their rulings. Only such a change will 
ensure that the law will realize its potential for safeguarding the rights of minorities and promoting social 
justice. In a system in which majority groups are overrepresented among political functionaries, and the 
majority either overtly or covertly seeks to deprive minority groups of their individual and collective 
rights, it is the role of the law, especially via the courts, to perform its counter-majoritarian function and 
protect the status and rights of minorities. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  This issue is compounded by the fact that minority groups generally lack adequate political power to ensure 
full implementation of the remedies rewarded once legal proceedings have concluded. 
2  ILAN PAPPÉ, THE FORGOTTEN PALESTINIANS: A HISTORY OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL 6 (2011) 
[hereinafter FORGOTTEN PALESTINIANS]; As’ad Ghanem, State and Minority in Israel: The Case of the Ethnic State and the 
Predicament of its Minority, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 428, 430 (1998).
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II. THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE RIGHTS FOR MINORITY GROUPS 
Before examining the litigation pursued by the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel in an attempt 
to secure their collective rights, the Article first will outline briefly the impetus for, and evolution of, 
individual and collective minority rights. In most societies, minorities tend to be at a distinct 
disadvantage in relation to majority groups. Indeed, exceptions notwithstanding, the socio-political status 
of the majority is almost always superior to that of the minority by virtue of its position as the dominant 
group in society.3 Consequently, majorities can–and often do–secure favorable access to the spectrum of 
national resources to the detriment of minorities. Furthermore, minority groups often are exposed to 
significant pressures to assimilate and therefore face the risk of cultural erosion and loss of their unique 
identities.4 
 
Substantive national minorities5 and indigenous minorities, whose statuses as minorities almost 
without exception have been established against the groups’ will via war and/or colonization, generally 
seek to maintain their unique group-based identities. In addition to equality on the individual level–and 
freedom from discrimination as members of a minority group–they seek group-differentiated rights in 
order to preserve their culture and identity. International law addressing minority rights establishes that 
national minorities, particularly indigenous minorities, who are among the most maligned and 
disadvantaged of all minority groups globally, require special protections.6 Therefore, a number of 
instruments have been adopted to address this reality, namely, the 1992 United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (“1992 UN 
Declaration”) and the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“2007 UN 
Declaration” or the “2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights”).7  
 
Instruments of international law are increasingly drafted with the intention of responding to 
claims brought forth by minority groups generally, and to specifically address their need for collective 
rights. Collective rights, which can be read into earlier instruments of international law, are included in 
both the 1992 and the 2007 UN declarations, but they are particularly pronounced in the 2007 
Indigenous Declaration.8 The specific rights guaranteed to the group depend on the nature of the group, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  The experience in South Africa is a prime exception to this assertion, where the (white) minority was able to 
dominate the African majority and other minorities (“coloured”, Indian, etc.) by virtue of its wealth and military. The 
same scenario has been experienced in many other postcolonial nations and in countries in which economic and military 
power are correlated with being a member of a particular religious or linguistic group, which comprises the minority of 
the population, such as: the white residents of Jamaica, the Spanish colonials of Mexico, and more. Nonetheless, the far 
more widespread societal dynamic is that described in the text here. See generally, TED R. GURR, PEOPLES VERSUS STATES: 
MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY (2000). 
4  See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 12 
(1995) [hereinafter Multicultural Citizenship]; WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS (2007) (exploring 
intergovernmental organizations’ establishment of multiculturalism policies). 
5  The term “substantive minority” refers to minority groups comprising at least a small percentage, or more, of 
a country’s population. See generally Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in Deeply-Divided Societies: The Case 
of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 345 (2008) (arguing for participatory equality for ethnic and racial 
minorities). 
6  See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-215 (2d ed. 2004).   
7  Not all minority groups aim to attain the same kind of rights. Immigrant groups, whose minority status can 
be assumed to derive from an active choice on the part of the individual to join a new society, are expected to integrate 
into their chosen society and adopt the norms of that country. The experience of national minorities, however, is 
different.  The term, “national minority” refers to ethnic, religious, or racial groups that, either by virtue of their 
indigeneity to the place or through immigration, constitute a minority percentage of the population of a state.   
8  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm. 
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but irrespective of the particular rights, they are conferred upon the minority due to its uniqueness as a 
group.9 
 
A basic tenet established early in the 1992 UN Declaration is that members of minority groups 
must be able to exercise their rights “individually as well as in community with other members of their group.”10  
The wording of this clause suggests a differentiation between the individual’s right to equality, regardless 
of membership in any religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other national minority, and the minority group’s 
right, as a whole, to what is essential for the maintenance of the collective. The codification of this 
concept paved the way, at least in part, for the more explicit iteration of collective rights contained in the 
2007 UN Declaration.11    
 
The types of collective rights stipulated therein range from property ownership and enjoyment 
rights, to language rights, to various manners of cultural expression (including the preservation of 
religious, agricultural, and medicinal practices), to self-administration and even autonomy over certain 
spheres of life, such as education. Finally, it also includes a requirement that the government consult 
with the relevant group on issues which are liable to impact them directly.12 Building on this foundation, 
the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights calls on states to refrain from taking any measures that would 
dispossess indigenous peoples of their lands or resources, force their assimilation, or otherwise deprive 
them of their unique cultures.13 Importantly, and in line with these instruments, the realization of 
collective rights requires applying special measures on a permanent or semi-permanent basis in order to 
assure appropriate protection of each minority group’s unique and usually fragile identity and interests.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 4, at 12. See generally, WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: 
NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 83-84 (2001) [hereinafter Politics in the Vernacular] (arguing that 
special measures for minority groups generally provide them with legal protection, both on individual and collective 
levels, with the aim of achieving equality with majority groups. Minority groups are in particular need of these 
protections due to their members being the frequent target of discriminatory actions and pressure to assimilate). 
10 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, at Art. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18 1992).  
11  See, e.g., Preamble of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/61/295 at 3 (Sept. 13, 2007) available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf 
(retrieved 5 Apr 2013) [hereinafter the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights] (stating in relevant part: “Recognizing and 
reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international 
law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and 
integral development as peoples.”). 
12 For instance, Article 13 of the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights stipulates a right on the part of 
indigenous peoples and requires that states enable them to “designate and retain their own names for communities, 
places and persons.” Id. at Art. 13(1). Article 14 of the Declaration lays out a requirement that indigenous groups be 
allowed to control and steer their own education systems. Id. at Art. 14(1). Article 15 emphasizes the importance that 
their histories and collective memories be “appropriately reflected in education and public information.” Id. at Art. 15(1). 
Article 18 guarantees indigenous peoples the right to “participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their 
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain 
and develop their own indigenous decision making institutions.” Id. at Art. 18. Regarding traditional medicinal practices, 
and their connection to the land and flora, Article 24 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional 
medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and 
minerals.” Id. at Art. 24(1). Article 26 stipulates not only the right of the indigenous peoples to maintain use of their 
land, but it also calls on states to recognize their systems of determining ownership. Id., at Art. 26. 
13  Article 8 of the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights reads: “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the 
right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.” Id. at Art. 8(1). 
14  Jabareen, supra note 5. 
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It is important to note that collective rights are not to come at the expense of the individual 
rights to which each citizen is entitled, regardless of group affiliation.15 In other words, collective rights 
must not penalize or restrict the individual freedoms and rights of a member of the minority group. By 
the same token, the realization of collective rights is often necessary in order to guarantee equality on the 
individual level and between majority and minority groups. Minority groups cannot realize their labor 
and social rights, for example, without living in an environment that is linguistically accessible. Neither 
the collective nor the individual rights of members of minority groups can be fulfilled without ensuring 
that the minority is able to participate effectively in the life of the nation.16   
  
Each state has assets held collectively by its citizens and whose distribution is determined by 
those in power. Collective assets include public budgets, adequate representation in decision-making 
bodies, land, representation in, and control over, the state’s identity, and more. The state and its decision 
makers assume the position of trustee of these assets and thus have an inherent duty to divide them 
equitably. Guaranteeing collective rights for minority groups can help to ensure that they, and not only 
the majority, have access to, and are able to participate in, the fair and equitable distribution and 
enjoyment of such public assets. 
 
The application of group rights is meant to transform the situation of minority groups and to 
enlist the institutional power of the legal and judicial system to play a role in societal transformation.  
Consistent with this view, only a fundamental societal change that is free of conditions of group 
subordination may address the injustices suffered by the marginalized group. This concept suggests 
conceiving the notion of group equality as "a substantive societal condition"17 and to view the 
eradication of continuing societal conditions of injustice and inequality as the paramount concern. The 
fundamental goal of a struggle for group equality, then, must be “the complete transformation” of the 
society.18 The end of group discrimination, according to Charles Lawrence, “requires fundamental 
societal transformation, not just adjustments within established hierarchies”.19 The abolishment of group 
discrimination requires redistribution of societal resources. Accordingly, the task of group rights is to 
carry out this societal transformation. 
A real question arises as to what means should be employed in order to engender such a 
transformation. Proponents of litigation as a strategy for securing minority rights suggest that general 
political processes cannot be trusted to defend minority rights, as they are, by definition, powered by the 
will of the majority and set up as such to prevent a tyranny of the minority–an experience particularly 
feared in a post monarchy or post dictatorship society.20 As the argument follows, only through counter-
majoritarian bodies such as the courts, namely the Supreme Court, can minorities stand a chance of 
having their rights defended based on principle (enshrined in law), rather than on economic, social, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Yousef T. Jabareen, Toward Participatory Equality: Protecting Minority Rights Under International Law, 41 ISR. L. 
REV. 635, 656 (2008). 
16  For more on this point, see Politics in the Vernacular, supra note 9. 
17  Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
819, 824 (1995). 
18  Id. at 825. 
19 Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword to Who Are We? And Why Are We Here? Doing Critical Race Theory in Hard 
Times, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY xi, xviii (Francisco Valdes et al., eds., 2002).  
20 Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 
YALE L. J. 153, 172 (2002). 
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other political concerns of the majority relative to the attitudes and perceptions of the minority at the 
time.21 
Another stream of thought, however, suggests that sustainable change cannot be achieved when 
it is imposed on the majority by a counter-majoritarian institution such as the courts.22 Therefore, critics 
of activist courts and of seeking major change on behalf of minorities through them, contend that the 
role of the courts is to uphold basic principles without creating new frameworks for the roles and actions 
of governments and government actors, especially given that judges may not consistently represent the 
views of the public or be in a better position to dictate morality.23 The latter, they argue, is destined to 
backfire, causing resentment on the part of the majority of the minorities whose rights were “stolen” 
through luck of the draw of the right court, and ultimately leading to circumstances in which minority 
rights are enshrined in the books but absent from practice on the ground.24  
An additional, often parallel, argument against using litigation to obtain minority rights is that it 
may have the undesired effect of divorcing political issues from the treatment of minorities, where the 
political issue must be addressed in order for any change to be lasting.25 In other words, given that the 
desired remedies often are far broader than the addition of specific programs, policies or cosmetic 
changes to public spaces, perhaps these changes need to be made through the political branches; or 
perhaps these are the kinds of changes that cannot be legislated, court-ordered, or otherwise politically 
and legally forced upon societies. And even if civil and minority rights advocates cannot wait for society 
to "evolve,” and political and legal means are a necessary immediate step, perhaps for them to have any 
substantive impact, they must be accompanied by major grassroots movements, shared by both majority 
and minority groups, which directly address the political, and not just the legal, aspects of the problem. 
Furthermore, many opponents of using litigation to secure minority rights cite the legitimacy that 
such tactics grant the same institutions that often serve as “rubber stamps” or as active participants in 
furthering minority discrimination.26 An additional critique often raised regarding the reliance on 
litigation to achieve minority rights is that it entails significant financial investments that are often 
prohibitive for members of minority groups. Accordingly, these significant financial investments 
certainly do not guarantee equal access to litigation as a strategy–as opposed to public political action, 
establishing grassroots organizations, and other methods of creating social change that require relatively 
little investment or expertise.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  See generally GAD BARZILAI, COMMUNITIES AND LAW: POLITICS AND CULTURES OF LEGAL IDENTITIES 
(2005); but c.f. id. (arguing that it is highly questionable whether courts are, in fact, counter-majoritarian, or whether they 
simply further the majority’s views through a more specific forum). For an additional critique, see Gad Barzilai, The 
Ambivalence of Litigation: A Criticism of Power, 13 JADAL (2012), http://mada-research.org/en/files/2012/05/Jadal13/Eng 
/Gadi-barzilai.pdf. 
22 Id. at 161. 
23  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 58-72 (1962). 
24  See, e.g., Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 967, 982 (1997) (“‘Rule-shifting’ has its merits and advantages, but it is simply less potent than 'culture-shifting’ in 
accomplishing the things I want to accomplish.”). 
25  Samera Esmeir & Rina Rosenberg, Resisting Litigation in Umm El-Fahm, HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, SERIES 2, 
NO. 2 (SPRING 2000), LITIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE V. PERILS, (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 
Affairs, Ser. No. 2(2), 2000). 
26  See e.g., Gad Barzilai, The Evasive Facets of Law: Litigation as Collective Action, ADALAH’S NEWSLETTER (Adalah, 
Hifah, Isr.), Feb. 2005, at 1, available at http://adalah.org/newsletter/eng/feb05/ar2.pdf. 
27  For more on this topic, see, e.g., Preliminary Material, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF MARGINALISED INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES IN NATIONAL CONTEXT, i-xxi (D. Anagnostou & E. 
Psychogiopoulou eds., 2010).  
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It is this author’s contention that there must not be a definitive choice made between litigation 
and other political or grassroots methods of creating lasting social change for minorities. Both are 
necessary, and both must be bolstered in the case of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel. But they 
must be wielded appropriately–each utilized or abandoned, depending on the issue and its surrounding 
context. In the context of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, which will be explored below, the 
community’s extreme lack of power and influence, from the legislature to the street, has made litigation 
an attractive means of circumventing that impotency and attempting to shift the balance of power in 
order to examine issues of discrimination. What we shall see below, however, is that their lack of power 
has not been counterbalanced adequately by the courts–mostly due to the latter’s unwillingness to assert 
the full range of its authority and employ its tools. 
This article will review three prominent examples of collective assets–political representation, 
cultural-linguistic rights, and allocation of material resources–and it will then discuss the Palestinian-Arab 
minority’s attempts to achieve those rights through litigation. But first, in order to place these rights in 
context, let us conduct a short overview of this minority group’s historical and present reality. 
 
III. BACKGROUND ON PALESTINIAN ARABS IN ISRAEL 
In the aftermath of the 1948 war, a significant number of Palestinian Arabs remained within the 
borders of the newly established State of Israel and were granted citizenship. Since 1948, this group’s 
population has grown to eight times its original size (from 160,000 to around 1.3 million); however, it 
has remained roughly 18% of the total population throughout the years. Palestinian Arabs are a native, 
linguistic, religious, and ethnic minority in Israel. 
While this group is Palestinian ethnically and culturally, their legal status differs from other 
Palestinians in the region. Palestinians in pre-1948 historic Palestine may be divided today into three 
broad groups: Palestinians living in the West Bank under Israeli military rule and in Gaza under a 
mixture of self-rule and ultimate Israeli military control, in which most of the population is stateless28; 
Palestinian residents of Israeli who occupied and annexed East Jerusalem (Palestinian East Jerusalemites) 
and hold permanent residency in Israel29; and, the focus of this article, Palestinian Arabs in Israel who 
became citizens of Israel following the 1948 war. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  The majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza hold no citizenship in any country, particularly those 
who were born in either of those locations. That said, there are those Palestinians in Gaza who hold a nationality, such 
as in Egypt, and those in the West Bank who hold a nationality in Jordan or other countries; they are the minority. The 
vast majority of Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories are stateless; however, with the new recognition by 
138 states of Palestine as a state, Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem may find themselves eligible 
for passports and nationality in the state of Palestine. It is questionable, however, what kind of citizenship rights the 
state of Palestine could provide as long as it remains under Israeli occupation. For an analysis of litigation brought on 
behalf of Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza over the years, and the level of success and failure in securing 
basic human rights and in challenging violations of international humanitarian law, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE 
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2002). The legal issues 
and rights sought by Palestinians living under occupation in these areas are significantly different from those of 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, whose struggle is primarily for equality of citizenship and equal participation in society as 
individuals and as a collective. The rights and legal challenges brought by Palestinian minorities in foreign countries, after 
having emigrated to them or after having been accepted as refugees by them, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
29  Immediately following Israel’s occupation of the area now known as East Jerusalem (among the other 
territories captured), Israel annexed East Jerusalem as part of Israel and has since applied full Israeli law and jurisdiction 
over the area. Palestinian East Jerusalemites hold permanent residency–a status which, among other limitations when 
compared to citizenship, is revocable under certain circumstances, including changing one’s center of life even to other 
parts of the occupied Palestinian territory. 
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It is important to note that the uniqueness of this group is not only derived from their status as a 
national minority, but also from the fact that they are an indigenous, original community. They continue 
to live in their homeland, the place in which they lived long before the inception of the State of Israel, 
when they were part of the majority group together with the rest of the Palestinian people.30 The State of 
Israel was established in 1948 on the ruins of the native Palestinian people, for whom the 1948 events 
were a national tragedy—known in Arabic as the Nakba, or “catastrophe.”31 The indigenous nature of 
the Palestinian-Arab population, with national, linguistic, cultural, and religious characteristics 
distinguishing it from the majority group, is an integral part of the way in which it experiences its 
condition and status in Israel, and constitutes the most central rift in Israeli society—the national-ethnic 
divide.32   
 Israel is officially defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Palestinian Arabs hold Israeli 
citizenship, but their national and ethnic affiliation to Palestinians has led successive Israeli governments 
to view them with great suspicion.33 Jewish-Israeli society questions Palestinian Arabs’ loyalty to Israel, 
while the latter continually re-evaluates its role within Israeli society and politics and within the region at 
large.34 In the shadow of the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict, a great deal of hostility shapes these attitudes, 
as the Jewish majority views Palestinians who remained in the State as part of the Arab world, as a 
potential fifth column, and often simply as enemies of the State. The primary consequence of these 
attitudes has been that, by every measurable standard—such as income, education, infrastructure, 
employment, the criminal justice system, and the level of social services—Palestinian-Arab citizens lag 
far behind Jewish citizens.35 Palestinian Arabs continue to be excluded from the centers of power and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  See EDWARD SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (2d ed. 1992) (critiquing Zionism’s impact on the 
Palestinians); see also BARUCH KIMMERLING & JOEL S. MIGDAL, PALESTINIANS: THE MAKING OF A PEOPLE 162-63 
(2003). 
31  An-Nakba (the Catastrophe) is the term used by Palestinians and Arabs referring to the exodus and 
displacement of Palestinians from their land in the immediate aftermath of the founding of Israel in 1948. It is estimated 
that nearly 800,000 Palestinian were driven from their homes into exile (either forcibly or in search of temporary refuge), 
and they became refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the neighboring Arab countries. Palestinian society and 
the Palestinian way of life were largely destroyed. The tragic consequences of an-Nakba still reverberate today and fuel 
the Palestinian struggle for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. See ILAN PAPPÉ, THE MAKING OF THE 
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1947-51 (1994) (examining essential diplomatic and military battles, with special focus on the 
creation of the Palestinian refugee problem and the failure of international mediation to achieve peace). Nearly 160,000 
Palestinians remained in Israel. They were stunned by the Arab defeat, weak, and without a national political leadership. 
AS’AD GHANEM, THE PALESTINIAN-ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 1948-2000: A POLITICAL STUDY 11-12 (2001). 
32  See AMAL JAMAL, ARAB MINORITY NATIONALISM IN ISRAEL: THE POLITICS OF INDIGENEITY (2011) 
(outlining the struggle of Arab-Palestinian citizens to reframe their citizenship rights in the context of indigeneity and 
Arab collective rights within the ethnocratic structure of Israel’s majority); Ghanem, supra note 31 (tracing the political 
activity of Arab-Palestinians and describing the ideological streams of Arabs in Israel); Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and 
the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432 (1992) (arguing that various 
principles of citizenship legitimation have resulted in divergent types of citizenship for Jews and Arabs); Nadim Rouhana 
& As’ad Ghanem, The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case of Palestinian Citizens in Israel, 30 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. 
STUD. 321 (1998) (contending that Israel’s present ethnic structure cannot provide its Palestinian citizens with equality, 
identity, and security). 
33  Muhammad Amara, The Collective Identity of the Arabs in Israel in an Era of Peace, in THE ISRAELI PALESTINIANS: 
AN ARAB MINORITY IN THE JEWISH STATE 249, 250-51 (Alexander Bligh ed., 2003); see generally Ghanem, supra note 31 
(arguing that Israel is an ethnic state that has employed sophisticated policies of exclusion and discrimination to deny 
equality to the Arab minority); Peled, supra note 32 (arguing that Israel’s ethnic democracy has served as a vehicle for 
discrimination against the Arab minority). 
34 DAN RABINOWITZ & KHAWLA ABU-BAKER, COFFINS ON OUR SHOULDERS: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL 11-12 (2005). 
35 See generally ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR., COMMENTS ON THE COMBINED INITIAL AND FIRST PERIODIC 
REPORT CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
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are grossly underrepresented in government institutions, as well as in the general public sphere.36 
Political parties representing the community in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) have consistently played 
the role of a permanent opposition; being unwelcome in any governing coalition and enjoying few 
political peers, they have difficulty pushing through legislation, and although they sit on Knesset 
committees they do not set their agendas, rendering them relatively impotent in advancing their 
community’s minority rights.37 
 
Indeed, prejudice against Palestinian Arabs in Israel distorts the Israeli political process in the 
two ways noted by Professor John Hart Ely’s process-oriented theory.38 First, due to a deep-seated 
prejudice against the Palestinian Arabs on the part of almost all of the other majority sub-groups, 
Palestinians are barred from the Israeli “pluralists’ bazaar” that would otherwise enable them to build 
coalitions with other groups with shared interests on given issues (Palestinians and disadvantaged Jews). 
As such, they consistently end up on the losing side of the classification. Second, prejudice affects the 
judgment of government decision makers who, being occupied by positive myths about their own group 
and negative myths about “outsider” groups, avoid coalitions with Arab parties. In addition, government 
decision makers consistently devalue the cost of their actions where the Palestinian-Arab community, 
with which they do not identify, will be the one that is primarily affected.39	  
Like other national and indigenous minorities worldwide, the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel 
seeks collective rights in order to enjoy and express its identity and equalize its position vis-à-vis Israel’s 
Jewish majority, on both the individual and group levels.40 This goal is sought specifically in relation to 
the three types of collective rights that will be reviewed in this article: representation in decision-making 
bodies, cultural-linguistic rights, and allocation of material resources.   
Indeed, the need for these collective rights was in recent years expressed by the community itself 
in the political document released in 2006 and entitled The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel 
(“The Future Vision”).41 Formulated by a wide range of Palestinian academics, legal experts, and 
community leaders, the Future Vision document outlines their thoughts and hopes regarding their 
current and future challenges as citizens within a state whose identity, collective history, and ethos they 
do not share–a state with a majority that holds a different vision than theirs.42 The document also offers 
concrete recommendations for the changes necessary to realize their collective rights, to make room for 
both majority and minority visions of the State and their existence in it.43 Indeed, the Future Vision 
addresses the three realms discussed in this article indicating the centrality of these realms for the 
community. 
In regards to the Right to Power Sharing and Appropriate Representation, the framers of the document 
seek effective representation and participation in the decision-making procedures employed within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1998). 
36 See Ghanem, supra note 31, at 165. Also, in 2009, only 7% of all civil employees were Arab. See also Nabil 
Khattab et al., Social Justice in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel, THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/social-justice-in-jewish-arab-relations-in-israel.  
37  See Ghanem, supra note 31, at 165. 
38  See ELY, supra note 23, at 145-70 (arguing that the two degrees of prejudice experienced by a minority group 
indicate a failure of the legislators to accord a group equal respect and concern). 
39  Id. at 153-58.  
40  See Jabareen, supra note 5.  
41 The Nat’l Comm. for the Heads of the Arab Local Auths. in Isr., The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in 
Israel, 5 (2006), http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor-mostaqbali.pdf. [hereinafter Future Vision]. The 
author of this Article authored the legal chapter in Future Vision. 
42  Id. 
43  Id.  
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official institutions.44 They stipulate that “[t]he two groups should have mutual relations based on a 
consensual democratic system,” which is defined as “a coalition between the elites of the two groups, 
equal proportional representation, mutual right to veto and self administration of issues exclusive to each 
community.”45 Regarding Linguistic Rights, the authors of the document write that they seek “official 
recognition of Palestinian-Arab [collective] existence in the state, and [recognition of] their national, 
religious, cultural and linguistic character . . . .”46 A different part of the document asks the State to 
“guarantee[] a dual language system of both Arabic and Hebrew.”47 With respect to Allocation of Resources, 
the document calls for “equal distribution of resources[,] [including] budget, land and housing.”48  
Generally speaking, they “believe that Palestinian Arabs in Israel, as a collective and as individuals, 
should have equal participation in all public resources[,] including political, material and symbolic 
resources.”49 
The following section will outline the impetus for turning to the courts in an attempt to 
guarantee collective rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel. It will then trace the history, 
challenges, and outcome of several central cases brought before the Israeli Supreme Court (sitting as the 
High Court of Justice)50 in the struggle to achieve progress in the three essential categories of rights 
mentioned above.51 
IV. UTILIZING THE LAW AS A TOOL FOR THE RECOGNITION OF COLLECTIVE 
RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 
Civil rights advocates in democratic countries often turn to the courts in search of justice that 
appears unattainable through pressure exerted on the legislative and executive branches alone. As was 
mentioned above, in light of Jewish hegemony in Israel, the country’s executive and legislative branches 
hold disproportionate power. This renders the third branch of government, the judiciary, the only 
remaining avenue available for transforming the reality of the Palestinian-Arab minority–despite the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Id. at 10. 
45  Future Vision, supra note 41, at 11. 
46  Id. at 15. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 14. 
50  The Israeli High Court of Justice is a first and last instance court that reviews the laws, policies, and decisions 
made by the State, the military, and the state agencies. It holds its sessions in the Israeli Supreme Court, typically before a 
panel of three Supreme Court Justices, except in certain cases in which a larger panel is deemed necessary. The 
proceedings are summary proceedings without evidentiary hearings or the opportunity for cross-examination. The relief 
sought is injunctive or mandamus relief against the state or a state actor. Nevertheless, during deliberations on High 
Court of Justice petitions–which can last up to years in some cases–many procedural and substantive tools are available 
to the Justices. For instance, Justices may order temporary injunctions, stays of execution, timelines for updates from the 
ground from any of the parties in order to inform their decisions, or may refer the case to mediation. Its decisions are 
final, with the rare exception of cases in which there has been a change in the factual situation or in the law since the 
decision was granted, and a new hearing is therefore required. The abbreviation “HCJ” before a case name indicates that 
the case was determined by this Supreme Court proceeding. The terms “Supreme Court” and “High Court of Justice” 
are used interchangeably in this Article, both referring to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. 
51  The Israeli Supreme Court’s members (up to fifteen) are selected, as are all Israeli judges, by the Judicial 
Selection Committee. This Committee consists of nine members. It is chaired by the Minister of Justice, and includes the 
President and two other Judges of the Supreme Court, another Minister designated by the Government (in addition to 
the Minister of Justice), two members of the Knesset elected by the Knesset, and two representatives of the Israel Bar 
Association elected by the National Bar Council. Israeli Supreme Court justices have life tenure, unless they resign, retire 
at the age of seventy or are removed from office. The Supreme Court Justices must be citizens of Israel, and until today, 
there has only been one Palestinian Arab citizen member of the court, Justice Salim Jubran. Justice Jubran did not sit on 
the bench of any of the cases discussed in this Article. 
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that Palestinian Arabs are grossly underrepresented in that branch as well.52 Nevertheless, Palestinian-
Arab minority rights advocates have used the courts not only to remedy various forms of discrimination 
against individual members of the group, but also in an effort to secure group-based rights.53 
In the 1970s, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (“ACRI”) pioneered the strategy of filing 
legal petitions in Israeli courts on behalf of all residents of Israel in defense of fundamental rights. The 
focus on bringing such petitions on behalf of the Palestinian-Arab minority gained ascendancy in the 
mid-1990s. Shortly after, organizations founded by, and for, the Arab community, began to advocate 
specifically for the rights of Palestinian Arabs. Foremost among them is the non-profit legal 
organization, Adalah–The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel–which is almost exclusively 
dedicated to direct legal action.54 Irrespective of their particular focuses, all of these organizations view 
the law as an essential tool for the advancement of social equality and the attainment of individual and 
collective rights for the Palestinian minority.   
These organizations and others, as well as tens of private attorneys, bring a range of cases before 
the courts, many of which touch on central areas of contention between Palestinian Arabs and the State. 
Previous and ongoing cases have addressed the following issues, in the context of the claims made by the 
Palestinian-Arab community: land rights, budget distribution, representation in decision-making bodies, 
and educational and cultural rights. These emphases are reflected in the cases outlined below. This 
Article will focus on three leading cases addressing collective rights and it will briefly address a few 
others. The rulings outlined here represent the most influential cases on collective rights over the last 
two decades. The Article will demonstrate that while there have been notable successes in these cases, 
the overall effectiveness of solely using the law as a tool for promoting social change on the group level 
is questionable. 
A. Representation in Decision-Making Bodies  
 
1. Normative Framework 
 
In order for majority groups to maintain hegemony, minority groups are often consigned to the 
fringes of the decision-making processes, if not excluded from these altogether. Consequently, they lack 
the ability to wield meaningful influence over the management and distribution of state resources, such 
as budgets and land. Furthermore, they are rendered impotent in preventing or modifying the adoption 
of policies, legislation, and other decisions that negatively affect them.55 
 
Similarly, when a minority’s status is contested on the national level, a state’s de jure and de facto 
rules are often structured to the benefit of a more dominant group. In such situations, the principle of 
strict equality is insufficient. In order to compete on an equal footing, minority groups require special 
group-based arrangements and protections. Such arrangements could include proportional 
representation, the right to veto major decisions, self-steering in various spheres of life, and more.56  
Group-based arrangements are common in many countries throughout the world and have proven to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Ilan Saban, Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case of the Arab-Palestinian 
Minority in Israel, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885 (2004) [hereinafter Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies]. 
53  See Katie Hesketh et al., The Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel, ADALAH (Mar. 2011), 
http://adalah.org/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf. 
54  ADALAH: THE LEGAL CENTER FOR ARAB MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, http://adalah.org/eng/. 
55 See Asbjørn Eide, Minority Protection and World Order: Towards a Framework for Law and Policy, in UNIVERSAL 
MINORITY RIGHTS 87, 105 (Alan Phillips & Allan Rosas eds., 1995). 
56  Politics in the Vernacular, supra note 9, at 73-77. 
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an effective tool for rectifying inequality,57 as they help to override the majority’s natural tendency to 
safeguard its own interests to the detriment of those of minority groups.58 
 
One such arrangement, “appropriate representation”–which refers to the inclusion of members 
of the minority group in political decision-making bodies at all levels, not only numerically, but in a 
manner that faithfully reflects the minority group’s interests–is capable of obtaining equitable 
distribution of material and cultural resources, and facilitates the realization of their group-based 
aspirations and need for identity recognition.59 The goal of appropriate representation is that the 
inclusion of members of the minority group be authentic, effective, and (at a minimum) proportionate to 
the minority group’s percentage of the population; in other words, representation must not be 
tokenistic.60 Those individuals appointed must represent the interests of their group; the appointees must 
have meaningful decision-making power; and, the number of representatives must be large enough to 
hold real influence over the outcome of the decision-making processes. 
 
Simultaneously, appropriate representation of minorities entails not only enabling the minority 
group to meaningfully participate and receive a share of the full gamut of national resources, but it also 
requires government and public bodies to develop and implement mechanisms of consultation with 
representatives of the minority groups in order to ensure that an effective forum is in place to address 
the interests and concerns of the group.61 The 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights recognizes the 
significance of this issue for minority groups, particularly indigenous minorities, and calls on states to 
take active steps to combat discrimination against minorities through consultation and cooperation with 
minority representatives.62 Such steps include consulting minority groups in the process of appointing 
officials, ensuring that they are equal partners in designing mechanisms of participation, and including 
recognized community leaders in every stage of the decision-making processes, especially those that will 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57  See generally Id.; Clive Baldwin, Chris Chapman & Zoe Gray, MINORITY RIGHTS: THE KEY TO CONFLICT 
PREVENTION (Minority Rights Group, 2007). 
58 Examples of countries that have established “consociational” systems of representation include Belgium, 
Lebanon, Switzerland, and Canada-Quebec. Likewise, The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, mentioned above, 
calls for consociationalism in Israel as a means of securing true power-sharing. Future Vision, supra note 41. As was 
discussed in the previous section, the Palestinian Arab political parties hold a disproportionally low percentage of seats 
in the Knesset (eleven of 120). Hesketh, supra note 53, at 52. Again, given that the Palestinian Arab parties have 
consistently remained in the opposition, their ability to successfully introduce legislation regarding their community’s 
minority rights, that will pass either in a committee or on the floor of the Knesset, is limited at best, rendering their 
representation little more than a token. 
59  See Ilan Saban & Scot Streiner, Appropriate Representation of Minorities: Canada’s Two Types Structure and the Arab-
Palestinian Minority in Israel, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 563, 565-68 (2006) (discussing the two types of appropriate 
representation).  
60  See Id. at 566 (discussing how dense appropriate representation surpasses the scope of class appropriate 
representation by obsessing about the consequences to minority groups).  
61  Politics in the Vernacular, supra note 9, at 87-88. 
62  The 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights, supra note 11, at Arts. 15(2), 17(2), 18, 19, 30, 32, 36 and 38; see 
also S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-Empowerment, 
JURIST (Oct. 3, 2007), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php 
(providing a discussion of the rights afforded by the resolution as well as the legal and political significance of its 
adoption). 
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2. Case Study: Legal Action Regarding Representation in the Israel Land 
Council 
 
Beyond Palestinian-Arab representation in the Knesset, a common sphere in which consultation 
and cooperation with minority groups is gravely needed, is that of land rights. The ability of the 
Palestinian-Arab minority to maintain and develop a presence in its historical lands, and to have freedom 
of choice in location, either as a community or integrated among Jewish Israeli residents, is crucial to its 
standing within society.63 It is also important for a meaningful share of the resources and power of 
society, on a multitude of levels, from economic to cultural to political. 
 
The leading case addressing this issue was filed in 1998 by the ACRI against the Israel Land 
Administration (“ILA”). The ILA did not include Palestinian-Arab representatives within the Israel Land 
Council (“ILC”), its primary decision-making body.64 The case relied heavily on Women’s Network in Israel 
v. Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, a 1998 precedent setting ruling relating to fair representation of 
women in senior public bodies.65 In Women’s Network, the Supreme Court held that women must be 
afforded adequate representation on the boards of government companies and must be appointed to 
senior positions in comparable public entities. Furthermore, the ruling stated that in order to achieve the 
goals of equal representation and equality, affirmative measures might be necessary.66 
 
Using this case as a basis, the petitioners in the ACRI case hoped to achieve a similar outcome 
for Palestinian Arabs in Israel, specifically in relation to representation in the ILC. The ILC, established 
in 1960 under the Land Administration Law, is one of the country’s most powerful public bodies.67  
Responsible for administering over 93% of the total land in Israel, the ILC determines both land 
allocation and land use, on behalf of the State.68 The ILA’s Board consists of twenty-four seats. At the 
time of the filing of the petition, half of these seats were allocated to representatives of the Israeli 
government ministries, while the other half were representatives of the Jewish National Fund. While 
nearly 20% of Israeli citizens are Palestinian–an indigenous minority that has experienced numerous 
expropriations of its land–69 no single Arab citizen of Israel had ever occupied a seat on this powerful 
body.  
 
A number of factors influenced the final outcome of the petition. Immediately following its 
filing, the government attempted to reach a compromise by appointing one Arab to the Council. In light 
of the need for appropriate representation of national and indigenous minority groups, the petitioners 
clearly regarded this sole appointment as insufficient. Following the failed compromise attempt, and 
while the petition awaited deliberation in court, the Israeli Knesset passed two amendments to pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Hesketh, supra note 53, at 31-38. 
64  HCJ 6924/98 The Ass’n for Civil Rights in Israel v. Israel Land Auth. 55 P.D. V 15 [2001] (Isr.). The author 
of this Article was one of the two attorneys who represented the petitioner. 
65 HCJ 2671/98 Women’s Network in Israel v. Minister of Labor and Social Welfare 52(3) P.D. 630. [1998] 
(Isr.). 
66  Id., Judgment, para. 41. The decision is available in Hebrew at, http://www.civil-
service.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/DE151DF3 -9977-4667-B029-6732AA20BEB0/0/267198.pdf. For a brief discussion in 
English, see RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN (U. of Pa. Press, 2004) at 27. 
67 See Israel Land Administration Law, 5720-1960, 14 LSI 50 (1960-1961) (Isr.) (establishing the Israel Lands 
Council which governs and supervises all activities related to the law). 
68  Id.  
69  See generally FORGOTTEN PALESTINIANS, supra note 2 (tracing the historical narrative of Israel’s sizeable 
Palestinian minority); HUSSEIN ABU HUSSEIN & FIONA MCKAY, ACCESS DENIED: PALESTINIAN ACCESS TO LAND IN 
ISRAEL (2003) (exploring the ongoing Jewish-Arab land conflict and the policy ramifications of Israeli land policy on 
Israel’s significant Palestinian minority).  
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existing laws mandating adequate representation of Palestinian Arabs on the boards of directors of 
government-owned companies as well as in public service.70 
 
In July 2001, the Court delivered its final judgment. In its decision, the Court called on the State 
to give weight to the principle of adequate representation of Arab citizens on the ILC. Additionally, on 
the operative level, the Court recommended the government to affirm its recent Arab appointment to 
the Council and to appoint an additional Arab member. 
 
Notably, the Court’s ruling went beyond the concrete circumstances of membership in the 
Council. The Court seemed to formulate, for the first time, a binding legal principle–albeit not a 
statutorily recognized one–that the State is obligated to consider the need for adequate representation of 
Palestinian citizens in public bodies, especially those vested with pivotal public functions.71 Echoing the 
ruling in the case pertaining to adequate representation of women in public companies–Women’s 
Network–the Court noted that ensuring the representation of Palestinian citizens in public bodies might 
require affirmative action.72 The ruling also included a declaratory statement that “for the benefit of 
Israeli society, and for the good of the individuals who comprise it, the principle of equality between 
Arabs and Jews must be cultivated.”73 The operative part of the judgment in this case, however, was 
relatively weak in comparison to the more direct and stronger worded order for adequate representation 
of women dictated in the Women’s Network case.  
 
At the time, the ruling was hailed as a tremendous success by Jewish and Palestinian-Arab civil 
rights activists alike. It was described by ACRI as a “precedent-setting judgment mandating affirmative 
action for Arab citizens” and “a significant step forward in the struggle for equality . . . . [O]n a practical 
level, [the decision] enable[ed] the involvement of Arab citizens in official decision-making processes.”74 
 
Despite this ‘landmark’ ruling, a deeper reading of the judgment and its practical implications 
reveals a different story. The Court ruled that out of the twenty-four people who sit on the Council, the 
State was only required to appoint two Arabs. Clearly this is far less than 20%, the approximate 
percentage of Palestinian-Arab representatives that should have been appointed in a system of 
proportional representation. Secondly, the Court did not require consultation with the Arab community 
regarding the choice of whom to appoint. This omission left the door open for the appointment of 
‘token’ representatives–individuals who do not faithfully represent the interests of the community.75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In June 2000, a new amendment to the Governmental Companies Law, 1975, was passed by the Knesset, 
stating that, “In the board of directors of governmental companies, adequate representation will be given to the Arab 
population.” Art. 18(a)(1) of the Governmental Companies Law, 1975.  In December 2000, a new amendment to the 
Civil Services Law, 1959, applied the adequate representation mandate in civil service to the Arab population. Ali Haider, 
Arab Representation in the Civil Service, in Government Corporations and in the Court System, THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF CIVIC EQUALITY IN ISRAEL (2003), http://www.sikkuy.org.il/2003/english03/pdf/civilEn03.pdf;  
See also, in Hebrew, Art. 18(a)(1) of the Governmental Companies Law, 1975: http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html 
/law01/139032.htm#Seif86 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Art. 15(a) of the Civil Services Law, 1959: 
http://www.moital.gov.il/cmsTamat/InternalPage.aspx?FRAMELESS=false&NRNODEGUID=%7bF895A658-
CB43-4A12-BC63-A5DC8AB84F01%7d&NRORIGINALURL=%2fNR%2fexeres%2fF895A658-CB43-4A12-BC63-
A5DC8AB84F01%2ehtm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest#_Toc317671217 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
71  The Ass’n for Civil Rights in Isr., supra note 64, at ¶ 27. 
72  Id. at ¶ 29. 
73  Id. at ¶ 15. 
74 See Obligation on the State to Provide Proper Representation of Arabs in the Absence of Explicit Statutory Provision, THE 
ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR. (July 9, 2001), http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=5543 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
75  Saban, supra note 52, at 981. 
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Absence of such a guarantee threatens to render the duty to ensure adequate representation an “empty 
duty.”76 
 
It is therefore not surprising that the implementation led to a very poor outcome. Initially, two 
members of the Palestinian-Arab community were appointed to the Council by the government; 
however, the community did not view them as credible.77 Furthermore, with time, the ruling was 
disregarded entirely, pointing to inadequacies in terms of enforcement. In 2009, the law was changed to 
require that all appointees (with the exception of two representatives of the Jewish National Fund) be 
employees of the State.78 A restructuring of the Council’s membership followed, and the State appointed 
new Council members who were all Jewish males. Because the makeup of the Council was a violation of 
the 2001 ruling as well as the legislation on women’s rights, in 2010 ACRI filed another action seeking 
representation of both Arabs and women on the Council.79 The case is still in progress, and the most 
recent interim decision was issued in May, when the Court issued an Order Nisi requesting the State to 
provide justification for why it has not appointed Arabs or women to the Council.80 
Despite what appeared in 2001 to be a successful ruling, to this day, there has been no resolution 
of the issue, and its outcome was in many regards a failure when tested on the ground. While, on the 
declaratory level, the Court seemed to acknowledge and express support for the collective rights of the 
Palestinian-Arab minority, the ruling was in fact quite narrow. The judgment failed to order the 
government to take the kind of practical steps that could have prevented this outcome. For example, the 
Court could have interpreted the law to require proportional and authentic representation, including 
government consultation with representatives of the Arab community, such as the Arab Knesset 
members and the heads of the Arab Local Authorities, prior to choosing the representatives. It is 
possible that such consultation would, as one would argue, be never-ending and that the internal politics 
of the community would be at play at such a level that it would be virtually impossible for the 
government to select representatives that would satisfy the entire Palestinian-Arab population. Without 
any attempt to consult the members of the community, however, the choices of representatives were 
even further from the consensus than they would have been with some consultation, despite its inability 
to produce consistent results. Instead, the weak and narrow ruling was coupled by a lack of will on the 
part of the government to implement the judgment in any meaningful way. Together, the outcome 
utterly failed to fulfill the petition’s goal of realizing the right of appropriate representation of Palestinian 
Arabs in Israel.81 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Id. 
77  See Decree Nisi Appropriate Representation Israel Lands Council, THE ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR. (May 
21, 2012), http://www.acri.org.il/en/2012/05/22/due-representation-in-ila/. 
78 Representation of Women and Arabs in Israel Lands Council, THE ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR. (July 24, 2013), 
http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=16915. 
79  Decree Nisi Appropriate Representation Israel Lands Council, THE ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR. (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=21394 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); see also THE ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR., 
http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/petitions/hit8318.pdf (in Hebrew).  
80  Joanna Paraszczuk, High Court: Not Enough Arab, Women In Top Government Posts, THE JERUSALEM POST (June 
6, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=240751; Order Nisi Regarding Representation of Women 
and Arabs in the Israel Lands Administration, THE ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR. (May 22, 2012),  
http://www.acri.org.il/en/2012/05/22/due-representation-in-ila (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
81  It should be noted that, as of this writing, the latest government appointments did not include any members 
of the Palestinian-Arab community. 
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3. Case Study: Legal Action Regarding Representation on the Planning and 
Building Commission 
From the Palestinian-Arab minority’s perspective, the real test as to the effectiveness of the 
Court’s ruling in the ACRI case promptly presented itself in a subsequent case, in which Palestinian-Arab 
citizens demanded adequate representation among the seventeen members of the Planning and Building 
Commission in the Northern District. Although Palestinian Arabs comprised more than 50% of the 
District’s inhabitants, only two Palestinian-Arab members served on the Commission.  
The National Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel, a self-organized 
umbrella group that represents all Palestinian-Arab mayors in Israel, petitioned the Supreme Court 
arguing that the inclusion of only two Palestinian-Arab members out of a total of seventeen violated the 
right to equality of the District’s Palestinian-Arab residents. They further argued that this could not 
constitute adequate representation of the Palestinian-Arab minority when they constituted over 50% of 
the District’s residents.82 To further their argument, the petitioners relied on the new laws of adequate 
representation, the precedent-setting ruling in the ACRI case, and the exceptional importance of the 
Planning and Building Commission for the Palestinian-Arab residents of the district. 
As in the ACRI case, the Court rendered yet another disappointing judgment.83 It refused to 
accept the petitioners’ position that, under the adequate representation principle, the Commission’s 
makeup should be roughly proportionate to the makeup of the population under its authority. The Court 
accepted the government’s assertion that the Commission had no Palestinian-Arab professionals who 
qualified for membership partly because of the general lack of experienced Palestinian-Arab government 
employees. In doing so, the Court overlooked the fact that the lack of qualified or experienced 
candidates for the Commission among the Palestinian-Arab minority was a result of longstanding, 
historical exclusion of Palestinians from public service. The circle was thus completed once more: 
historical ethnic discrimination operates to rationalize and thereby perpetuate ethnic subordination.84 
To this day, there has been little progress in translating the spirit of the Supreme Court judgment 
in the ACRI case into concrete results. Currently, Palestinian-Arabs represent only seven to eight percent 
of all public employees despite comprising close to 20% of the population.85 Indeed, if anything remains 
of the Court’s affirmative action rhetoric in the ACRI case, it is the kind of affirmative action that, to use 
Delgado’s language, “serves as a homeostatic device, assuring that only a small number of . . . people of 
color are hired or promoted. Not too many, for that would be terrifying, nor too few, for that would be 
destabilizing. Just the right small number, generally those of us who need it least, are moved ahead.”86    
B. Cultural Rights: Linguistic Case 
 
1. Normative Framework 
 
Just as national and indigenous minorities seek the collective right of meaningful representation, 
they also require protection of their cultural rights in order to be able to fully express and enjoy their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  The author of this article was one of the two attorneys who represented the petitioners. 
83  HCJ 9472/00 The Nat’l Comm. of Arab Mayors v. Minister of Interior [2001] (Isr.). 
84  See Ronen Shamir, Zionism 2000: Past, Future, and the Qa’dan Family, 2 ADALAH’S REV. 27 (2000). 
85 In 2011, only 7.8% of all civil employees nationally were Arab. Ali Haider, Arabs, the Israeli Civil Service Needs 
You, HAARETZ (Aug. 16, 2012, 9:28 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/arabs-the-israeli-civil-service-needs-you-
1.458640. 
86 Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1223-24 (1991). 
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identities and safeguard them amidst social and political pressure.87 Some common cultural rights sought 
by minorities include the right to practice their religions freely, the right to use their traditional lands and 
the right to engage in traditional practices such as hunting and fishing, or the use of particular plants and 
herbs for medicinal purposes or in rituals.88 The realization of these rights requires not only non-
interference by states but also necessitates an obligation on the part of states to take positive measures to 
create the environment necessary for these practices.89 Creating such an environment may be achieved 
through a number of means including appropriate budget allocations, modifying law and policy for 
specific groups, or granting rights of self-government in particular spheres of life such that minority 
groups are able to control some of their own institutions, including those in the educational and cultural 
spheres. 
 
Language is a leading example of a cultural right, and linguistic preservation holds particular 
significance for national and indigenous minorities.90 Language is often embedded in religious and 
cultural practice and is instrumental for the preservation of these traditions. Furthermore, linguistic 
recognition and the right to use native languages in public forums provides minorities, who frequently 
face severe and prolonged discrimination, with the tools to access social and economic rights and 
services,91 thus aiding in equalizing the status of majority and minority groups. For instance, minorities 
require linguistic equality in order to compete fairly in the job market and in national networks of higher 
education—both of which are essential for the social and economic advancement of both individuals 
and their groups on the national level.92 Linguistic rights are also critical for promoting a sense of 
belonging, which contributes to social cohesion and stability. Thus, preservation of a minority’s language 
contributes to the group’s ability to compete on equal footing socially and economically and promotes 
the cultivation of a shared society.93 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87  Jabareen, supra note 15, at 665. 
88  See International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966; The Declaration 
on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 10, art. 1.1; The 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights, supra note 11, arts. 11 & 
12. For an overview of rights concerning a group’s cultural practices, see Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 4, at 30-31. 
89  See General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities art. 27, ¶ 6.1 & 7; The Declaration on the Rights of 
Minorities, supra note 10, art. 2.1, Dec. 18, 1992. 
90  Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 4, at 12; POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR, supra note 9, at 78–82. A relevant 
example of such an issue exists among the Kurdish communities in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. For more on that topic, see, 
e.g. Gurr, supra note 3. 
91  Such public services include, e.g., public health clinics, national post offices, public modes of transportation, 
and government offices such as the Income Tax Authority, the Social Security Institution, and the Ministry of Interior. 
92  Saban, supra note 52, at 925-38. 
93  In order to fully realize the linguistic rights of national and indigenous minorities, depending on their 
percentage of the population, it may be necessary for states to institute a policy of bilingualism. Such a policy entails 
granting the relevant languages equal status in both law and practice. Thus, all areas of the public sector become bilingual 
including, but not limited to, government documents and forms, mass media, courts of law, the labeling of road signs 
and public buildings, and so forth. Education systems may also adopt bilingualism, by which they teach both languages 
in order to advance equality and integration on the technical level and to promote the values of coexistence, acceptance, 
and intercultural education. Canada is a worthy example of a bilingual system. See Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 16-23 (U.K.). Article 16(1) 
stipulates generally that “English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal 
rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the parliament and government of Canada.” In the 1970s and 
80s, Canada undertook a comprehensive conversion to bilingualism, including all governmental and public service 
authorities. See Joseph Eliot Magnet, THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF CANADA (Y. Blais ed., 1995); compare to the status 
of Hebrew and Arabic in Israel: Ilan Saban & Muhammad Amara, The Status of Arabic in Israel: Reflections on the Power of 
Law to Produce Social Change, 36 ISR. L. REV. 5 (2002). On the importance of education for civic integration, see POLITICS 
IN THE VERNACULAR, supra note 9, at 293. In fact, guaranteeing linguistic rights in education is required by international 
law, for instance in The Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 10, at art. 4.4. 
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The importance of linguistic preservation, access, and equality is recognized in international law. 
Enshrined in many of the legal instruments of minority rights is an obligation of states to officially 
recognize minority languages and to incorporate them into public spaces.94 The 2007 Indigenous 
Declaration is notable in this realm95; as was previously mentioned, it allows indigenous groups to self-
administer their own education in their native tongue,96 and also requires government offices and 
services to be linguistically accessible to indigenous groups.97 The Declaration even emphasizes the 
importance of including indigenous languages on road signs.98 Perhaps not surprisingly, indigenous 
peoples were integral in the framing of the 2007 Declaration, and the final product reflects the primacy 
of linguistic rights from their perspective. 
 
2. Case Study: Legal Action Regarding Signposting 
 
Language and linguistic recognition is, similarly, a key demand of Palestinian Arabs in Israel. In 
1999, Adalah and ACRI brought legal action against the Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa and four other 
so-called “mixed” Jewish-Arab cities’ municipalities (Acre, Lod/Lydda, Ramle, Natzirat Illit),99 
demanding the inclusion of both Arabic and Hebrew in their signposting on the municipal level.100 The 
petition was filed not only because Arabs were unable to find their way around, but also in the hopes 
that adding Arabic to municipal signs would give members of the Arab community a sense of belonging, 
and would constitute an expression of their indigenous and historical connection to the land. 
In formulating the ruling, the Justices were forced to consider the status of Arabic as an official 
national language. Paragraph eighty-two of the British Mandate’s Palestine Order in Council of 1922 (as 
incorporated into Israeli law), treats the Arabic and Hebrew languages identically (in that order) as the 
two official languages of the State.101 Paragraph eighty-two provides a unique legal anchor for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 27; The Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 10, art. 4. 
95 S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-
Empowerment, JURIST (Oct. 3, 2007), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-
indigenous.php. 
96  The 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights, supra note 11, at art. 14.1 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to 
establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner 
appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.”). 
97  Id. at art. 13.2 (“States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure 
that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where 
necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.”). 
98  Id. at art. 13.1 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future 
generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and 
retain their own names for communities, places and persons.”). 
99  Some 10% of Arab citizens of Israel reside in so-called “mixed” cities such as Acre, Lydda, Ramle, Haifa, and 
Tel Aviv-Jaffa, cities which consist of sizable populations of Jewish and Arab residents. For instance, Tel Aviv 
developed alongside the ancient port city of Jaffa and today they constitute the same municipal unit. About 5% of the 
population of Tel Aviv is Palestinian Arab, primarily residing in Jaffa. Beyond the numbers, however, Jaffa, like many 
other cities in Israel, is historically significant to the Palestinian community living in Israel and beyond. Prior to the 
establishment of the State of Israel, four of the cities that requested via the petition to add Arabic captions (Acre, Lydda, 
Ramle, and Jaffa), were national, cultural, and economic centers for the Palestinian community until its overthrow in 
1948.  
100  HCJ 4112/99 Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa et. al. 56(5) PD 393 
[2002] (Isr.). For additional discussion on this case, see Zeev Segal, Do Israeli Arabs Have Collective Rights, 12 J. L. SOC’Y 94 
(2010) (hereinafter Segal); Michael Karayanni, Two Concepts of Group Rights for the Palestinian-Arab Minority Under Israel’s 
Constitutional Definition as a “Jewish and Democratic” State, 10 I. CON 304, 310 (2012) (hereinafter Two Concepts of Group 
Rights). 
101  Palestine Order of Council of the British Mandate of Palestine, 1922-1947, ¶ 82.  
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collective right held by the Palestinian-Arab minority, as opposed to an individual right.102 This special 
legal arrangement was never changed by the Israeli legislature; in fact, the Knesset has rejected attempts 
to nullify it.103 
As Justice Dorner commented in her concurring opinion, while the status of the English 
language as an official language was canceled in Art. 15(b) of the Law and Administration Ordinance, the 
Knesset rejected a bill attempting to annul the status of Arabic as an official language (Bill on the 
Language of the State – 1952, Knesset Record, Volume 12, Annex, at p. 2528).104 There may be other 
considerations for preserving this status, but from a normative perspective, there is a bilingual 
arrangement according to law. It should be noted that the Court refused to hear the issue again, and 
rejected the application for a review of the decision, in which the Court noted, inter alia, the power of 
political authorities to change the normative status on the topic:  
It has been clarified that the opinion of the Attorney General is not supported by the 
opinion. Needless to say, he, like the rest of those interested in the issue, is given the 
option to bring the issue before other official bodies more suited than the court for their 
determination.105 
That said, despite the legal status of Arabic as an official national language, in practice, Hebrew is the 
dominant language in all aspects of Israeli life and has been given added legitimacy and public presence 
through subsequent legislation and policy.106 
The Supreme Court decision was handed down in June 2002 and it represents the central legal 
precedent regarding the status of Arabic in Israel.107 In the decision, the Justices ordered the local 
authorities in the “mixed” cities to add Arabic to all signs within their respective municipal 
jurisdictions,108 as well as to all safety and caution signs and all signs leading to municipal institutions 
within the cities under their jurisdictions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  See Saban, supra note 52, at 925 (“The most far-reaching group-differentiated right that is granted to the 
Palestinian minority by Israeli Law is the normative status of Arabic as one of the two official languages of the state.”). 
Justice Dorner also commented on this uniqueness. See Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, 56(5) PD at ¶ 6 (Dorner, 
J., concurring) (“In general, the principle of equality between Jews and Arabs applies to personal rights. This rule has few 
exceptions, and among them is the recognition of the Arabic language as a second official language, along with the 
Hebrew language.”). See also Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, supra note 100. 
103  HCJ 7260/02 Municipality of Ramle v. Adalah, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.), available at 
http://elyon2.court.gov.il/files/02/600/072/F03/02072600.F03.htm (Isr.) (unpublished opinion). 
104  HCJ 4112/99 Adalah v. Municipality of Tel Aviv [2002] (Isr.). A summary of the verdict in English, as 
published by the petitioner (Adalah):  http://adalah.org/features/landlangrep/4112decision-eng.pdf.  
105  Id. at ¶ 5. See also Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, supra note 100. 
106  It should be stressed that, despite the identical formal normative statuses of Arabic and Hebrew established 
by The Palestine Order in Council, 1922, supra note 101, at Part VIII (82), later legislation provided for public aid for the 
cultivation of the Hebrew language only, such as the Supreme Hebrew Language Institute Law, 5713-1954, 7 LSI 140 
(1953) (Isr.) and the Law on the Use of the Hebrew Calendar, SH No. 1682, 312, Aug. 4, 1998, Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_word/law14/law-1682.pdf. Moreover, other legislation granted public 
assistance to the cultivation of other languages spoken by Israelis, to the exclusion of Arabic, an official language 
according to law. See National Authority for Yiddish Culture Law, SH No. 1577, 182, Mar. 17, 1996, Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_word/law14/LAW-1577.pdf (established the referenced 
authority in order to assist and encourage creativity in the Yiddish language); see also National Authority for Ladino 
Culture Law, SH No. 1577, 185, Mar. 17, 1996, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il 
/Law_word/law14/LAW-1577.pdf  (established the Ladino authority for the same purposes). 
107  For more on the ruling, see Two Concepts of Group Rights, supra note 100, at 310-14. 
108  The decision referred to the municipalities of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Lod/Lydda, Ramle, and Natzirat Illit.  
Following the filing of the petition, the municipality of Acre decided on its own accord to add Arabic to its signs, and 
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In Chief Justice Aharon Barak’s majority opinion, the Court emphasized that the Arab minority 
is not only a numerically large minority in Israel, but it is also a minority with a longstanding presence 
there.109 This emphasis is the first time in which an Israeli court granted legal standing to the status of 
the Palestinian-Arab minority as an indigenous minority, even if it did not use the actual word, 
“indigenous”.110 More significantly, the ruling in this case was based on a positive conception of the 
linguistic rights of the Palestinian-Arab citizens and the significant role language plays in maintaining 
identity. The judgment also strengthened the basis for the special status of the Arabic language in the 
State of Israel, particularly given what Chief Justice Barak described as the lengthy history of Palestinian-
Arab presence in the land.   
The petitioners considered the judgment to be "profoundly important" and hailed it as "an 
important step in the recognition of the collective rights of Arab citizens in Israel, primarily the right to 
language and culture.”111  
 
Nevertheless, similar to the petition on representation described in the previous section, the 
outcome of this legal action, even if it represented some modicum of progress, must be considered 
limited, both technically and in relation to recognition of the collective linguistic rights held by the 
Palestinian-Arab minority. First, although municipalities did indeed add captions to their signs, they 
practically made a mockery of the judgment, executing it in a blatantly unprofessional manner, including 
frequent spelling and grammatical errors that were unreasonable.112 For instance, Arab youth talked 
about a sign that was erected on one of the beaches in Israel on which it is written in Hebrew, “bathing 
is prohibited in this place” and in Arabic that “bathing is permitted.” A similar example is that of the city 
of Acre, which is written in Arabic letters as “Akko, ” the Hebrew name for the city, and not “Akka,” its 
Arabic name. Such is also the case for the cities of Be’er Sheva, Lod, and Tiberius. These errors 
demonstrated the municipalities’ insulting and belittling attitude toward the Palestinian-Arab citizens 
reading the Arabic signs. 
 
Secondly, on a fundamental level, the Arabic captioning added to the signs, in many cases, was a 
technical transliteration of the Hebrew writing appearing on the sign, rather than the label of the place 
with the authentic Arabic name to which Palestinian-Arab citizens are accustomed. By merely 
transliterating the Hebrew text, the central goal of collective linguistic rights and the main impetus for 
bringing the litigation—attaining a sense of belonging in the country and preserving the historical, 
original Arabic names of cities—certainly was not achieved.   
 
Naturally, a counter-argument can be made for the importance of uniformity in the names of 
places in a country in order to avoid splintering and exclusion of any one group and to foster social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
therefore its status in the petition was changed to mere formal respondent. A previous petition had led to bilingual 
signposting in Haifa, according to a settlement reached by the parties and given the status of a court judgment. HCJ 
2354/93 Ass’n for Civil Rights in Isr. and the Org. for Soc. Advancement in Haifa v. Municipality of Haifa, Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (unpublished opinion).  
109  Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, supra note 100, at ¶ 25. 
110  Id. (“Arabic is the language of the largest minority in Israel, one that has long lived in Israel. This language is 
connected to cultural, historical and religious characteristics of the Arab minority group in Israel. It is the language of 
citizens that despite the Arab-Israeli conflict wish to live in Israel as loyal and equal citizens, where their language and 
culture are respected (emphasis added).”). 
111  The Arabic Language is an Official Language in Israel, ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR. (July 28, 2002); Press 
Release, Adalah, Supreme Court Issues Historical Judgment Affirming the Collective Rights of Palestinian Minority in 
Israel (July 26, 2002), http://adalah.org/eng/Articles/141/Supreme-Court-Issues-Historic-Judgment-Affirming.  
112  See Hesketh, supra note 53, at 47. See also Press Release, Adalah, Adalah and ACRI Demand Implementation 
of Israeli Supreme Court Ruling Ordering the Addition of Arabic to Signs in Nazaret Illit Municipality (Nov. 19, 200), 
http://adalah.org/eng/Articles/955/News-in-Brief-. 
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cohesion. However, even the choice of such a name has the potential to be informed by the dominant 
culture’s choice. Without a deeper sense of cultural inclusion on the part of the Palestinian-Arab 
community, creating permanent, uniform names has the potential to be received as another affront by 
the majority on the minority. 
 
Moreover, the decision about word choice in labeling places was not the only critique that the 
case raises. Yet, two other major needs of the Palestinian-Arab community remained unaddressed: the 
need to mark Palestinian historical sites and the importance of recognizing Arab national heroes through 
signposting.113 Fulfillment of these needs would require adding new signs and changing existing ones, 
not simply adding Arabic captions to existing Hebrew signs. While the petition perhaps did not explicitly 
raise this deeper recognition of cultural and historical recognition, the Court’s oversight nonetheless 
represents a failure to recognize the full meaning that the language carries for each group. Indeed, the 
ruling failed to equalize the Hebrew and Arabic language’s status, thus turning a blind eye to the 
Palestinian-Arab population’s essential character as an indigenous national minority and their need for 
collective linguistic rights. 
 
Instead, despite the important and principled ruling on the status of the Arabic language, the 
obligation to add Arabic to municipal signs only received technical and formal expression. This will not 
result in the realization of the essential objective of bilingualism to which the Palestinian-Arab minority 
aspires.114 In fact, arguably, the decision weakened the position of Arabic vis-à-vis Hebrew and perhaps 
even that of the community as a whole, as it forced the judges to consider the relative statuses of the two 
languages, ultimately deciding in Hebrew’s favor.115 Highlighting this inferiority in a Supreme Court 
opinion could open the door for official authorities to find additional justifications, beyond those cited in 
the opinion, for deviating from the bilingual status required by law. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Many geographic places within and around the current borders of Israel have deep historical significance for 
the Palestinian-Arab minority, not only as individuals but also as a collective; these sites include unrecognized Arab 
villages, abandoned and destroyed villages, and other religious and historical sites. In most cases, there is no signage 
whatsoever in these places; however, in some places the sites have been given Hebrew names—old or new. 
Furthermore, many of the names currently in use for geographic locations reflect a Jewish Zionist narrative. This 
narrative is not only inappropriate, or at best incomplete, to Arabs, but it is also fiercely disputed and carries with it deep 
and painful connotations. Similarly, figures or events of significance to Palestinian-Arabs remained virtually 
unrecognized, even in neighborhoods in mixed cities in which Arabs have a sizable presence. See Saban, supra note 52, at 
935 (“In terms of the theoretical framework that was presented for group-differentiated rights, the minority’s demand is 
for a significant right to special representation and allocation, as distinct from merely formal linguistic representation. In 
other words, the demand is that the minority itself should be able to choose the linguistic representation that is adopted 
in its language. This will enable its participation—as an ethno-national community—in determining the public human 
landscape of the country.”). 
114  See four important documents: The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, supra note 41; Yousef T. 
Jabareen, An Equal Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel, MOSSAWA CENTER: 
THE ADVOCACY CENTER FOR ARAB CITIZEN IN ISRAEL (2006), http://www.mossawacenter.org/my_documents 
/publication/constitution_paper_ENG.pdf; Adalah, Democratic Constitution, ADALAH: THE LEGAL CENTER FOR 
ARAB MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL (2007), http://adalah.org/Public/files/democratic_constitution-english.pdf; Nadim 
N. Rouhana, The Haifa Declaration, MADA AL-CARMEL (2007), http://mada-research.org/en/files 
/2007/09/haifaenglish.pdf. 
115  Note the difference in the statuses of the two languages as described by Chief Justice Barak and by Justice 
Dorner, respectively. Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, supra note 100 at ¶ 25 (Barak, C.J.) (“The desire to ensure 
dignified coexistence between the descendants of our forefather, Abraham, in mutual tolerance and equality, justifies 
recognizing the use of the Arabic language in municipal signposting—in the same cities in which there is a significant 
Arab minority (six to 19% of the population)—alongside its senior relative, Hebrew.”); Id. at ¶ 7 (Dorner, J., concurring) 
(“While Hebrew is the first official language of the State of Israel, as the national language of the majority, the status of 
Arabic as an official language according to amended Paragraph 82 was designed to uphold the freedom of language, 
religion and culture for the Arab minority.”). 
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It is interesting to note that all three Justices on the panel, including the two in the majority, were 
divided in their reasoning, and this divide could explain the narrow, literal decision granted. Former 
Chief Justice Barak reasoned that Paragraph 82 of the Palestine Order in Council of 1922, which 
established the status of the Arabic language as an official language, did not create in and of itself a direct 
obligation to add Arabic to all municipal signs. Nonetheless, he reached this obligation through 
interpretation, balancing the various objectives of the discretion given to local authorities, namely in the 
implementation of the values of equality and in protecting language rights. 
 
Justice Dorner joined Chief Justice Barak’s decision, but her concurring opinion was based on 
different legal reasoning. In her view, the obligation of the respondent municipalities to add Arabic to all 
municipal signposting is anchored in Paragraph 82 of the Palestine Order.116 According to Justice 
Dorner, “[t]he status of the Arabic language as an official language cannot be reconciled with the 
reduction of signposting in certain areas within the jurisdiction of the respondent local authorities.” 
Justice Dorner went on to state that, “such a reduction in fact has a damaging connotation.”117 Justice 
Cheshin, in a lengthy dissenting opinion, reasoned that the petition must be declined both on the 
merits—as “theoretical, general and vague” —and on jurisdictional grounds, as ruling on the petition 
would constitute rendering “a political determination of the highest level,”118 which is beyond the scope 
of the Court’s jurisdiction. According to Justice Cheshin, the petition asked the Court to take political 
measures, which are within the authority of the political organs of the State—the government and the 
Knesset (Parliament)—and not the Court.119  
 
The opinion also revealed the reluctance of the Court (both the majority and dissent) to accept 
bilingualism as a right owed to substantial national minorities. The opening section of the Chief Justice’s 
opinion reveals an individualistic approach to the right to language120—one that is not easily reconciled 
with the collective essence of this right. This approach contradicts the same court’s rulings that declared 
Arabic’s status as the language of a long-present community in Israel. This is even more striking when 
compared to the collective approach taken by the Chief Justice regarding the status of the Hebrew 
language.121  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  Id. at ¶ 5 (Dorner, J. concurring). 
117  Id. at 480 (Dorner, J., concurring). 
118  Id. at ¶ 38 (Cheshin, J., dissenting).  
119  Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, supra note 100, at ¶ 55 (Cheshin, J., dissenting).  
120  See, e.g., Chief Justice Barak’s wording in paragraphs 16 and 19 of the opinion. Id. at ¶ 16 (Barak, C.J.) (“The 
first overall objective relevant to the present matter is that which deals with the protection of one’s right to his language. 
One's language is a part of his personality. It is the instrument with which he thinks.”); Id. at ¶ 19 (“Given that language 
is highly important to the individual and his development, one’s possibilities must not be limited because of language.”). 
121  See, e.g., Chief Justice Barak’s wording in paragraph 21. Id. at ¶ 21 (citations omitted) (“The fourth overall 
objective that must be considered here is recognition of the importance of language as an element in national cohesion 
and in defining the sovereign state. Language is not just an expression of an individual’s identity. Language is also an 
expression of the general public. It is the common thread that ties individuals to a particular society. It develops social 
cohesion in Israel. Hebrew is the force that unites us as members of one state. Hebrew cannot be owned by this group 
or that in Israel. ‘The Hebrew language is an asset held by the entire [Jewish] people.”). 
Chief Justice Barak’s narrow view of bilingualism is also illustrated by some of his later statements in the 
opinion, according to which the addition of Arabic to public signs will cause an injury to national cohesion—albeit a 
minor one. Such a statement could have serious ramifications for the status of the Arabic language. The “national 
cohesion” that the Chief Justice describes is an exclusive cohesion shared only by the Jewish majority, as distinct from an 
inclusive cohesion shared by both national communities existing in the state. Had it taken a broader view, the Court 
could have concluded that adding Arabic to municipal signs was in fact a step toward strengthening (bi)-lingual cohesion 
in the state, as it reflects the social-national, linguistic mosaic that is an essential element of Israeli society. 
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Justice Cheshin’s dissenting opinion also adopted a narrow view of the principle of bilingualism. 
He characterized the demand for language equality and group linguistic rights as political and one that 
“diverges from the function and authority” of the Court.122 Justice Cheshin proffered that the right of an 
Arab citizen in Israel to his language is a passive right that does not impose an affirmative right on the 
State to implement it via the addition of Arabic to municipal signs. Therefore, for Justice Cheshin, Israeli 
law does not recognize group rights, rather it only protects individual rights.123 Of course, his view was 
overruled by the two other justices. Yet, his view remains a source for developing future legal arguments 
against the collective linguistic rights of the Palestinian-Arab minority.  
Naturally, the decision served as the subject of much academic criticism.124 One such critique is 
that of Professor Michael Karayanni, who discusses this ruling as exemplifying his ‘thin’ concept of 
minority rights in relation to the Palestinian minority in Israel. Accordingly, Israeli constitutional law is 
prepared to grant some group accommodation rights in line with Justice Barak’s recognition of the Arab 
minority as an indigenous minority. However, such rights and accommodations are relative and limited; 
they are only permitted to the extent that they do not threaten the dominant status of Jewish rights. 
Indeed, both in the narrow ruling and in its practical outcome, the realization of the Palestinian-Arab 
minority’s collective linguistic rights was outweighed by the interest in preserving Jewish hegemony in all 
aspects of Israeli life, including cultural and linguistic expression. 
3. Case Study: Legal Action Regarding Language on Road Signs 
Another salient example of the literal as opposed to substantive fulfillment of these rights is the 
1997 case, Adalah. v. Ministry of Transportation, demanding that the Ministry of Transportation, the Public 
Works Department, and the National Roads Company add Arabic to all national road signs.125 The 
petition alleged discrimination against the Palestinian-Arab minority in violation of the official status of 
the Arabic language in Israel (under the Palestine Order in Council) and Israel’s requirements toward 
national minorities under international law. Furthermore, the petitioners argued that the absence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  Id. at ¶ 59 (Cheshin, J., dissenting). 
123  Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil Rights, supra note 100, at ¶ 19-24; See also Adalah and the Ass’n for Civil 
Rights, supra note 100, at ¶¶ 51-52 (Cheshin, J., dissenting) (“The petitioners come to us with a different view. The right 
that they claim—the right to cultivate a national and cultural identity—is not a right endowed to the individual on his 
own. In fact this is a right shared by all the state’s citizens by virtue of their being citizens. The right that the petitioners 
claim is derived from the fact of an individual belonging to a certain segment of the population: his membership in a 
cultural and national minority group . . . . We recognize the freedom of culture and of language. This right of an 
individual, as in the right of all individuals—subject to exceptions—grants him the right to engage in cultural activities 
as he wishes; every person is free to express himself in whatever language he desires, and the state is not permitted to 
obligate him to express himself in a certain language or to prevent him from using another language. However, the 
obligation imposed on the state to assist the minority to preserve and develop its language and culture—a quasi-
obligation—is not one that is recognized by us.”). 
124  Ilan Saban, A Lone (Bilingual) Cry in the Dark? Following HCJ 4112/99 Adalah v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 27 
TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 109 (2003-04); Yaacov Ben-Shemesh, State Neutrality and the Right to Language, Following HCJ 4112/99 
Adalah v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa National Neutrality and the Right to a Language, 8(1) MISPHAT UMIMSHAL L. & GOV’T 
347 (2005); Ilan Saban & Mohammad Amara, On Collective Rights and Reality: The Status of the Arabic Language in Israel, 4 ST. 
& SOC’Y MEDINA VE-HEVRAH 885, 909 (2005); Eyal Benvenisti, The Defense of Minority Communities in the Courts, LEGAL 
LEAVES C 463 (2003-04); Geirshon Girshon Gontovnik, The Right to Culture in a Liberal Society and in the State of Israel, 27 
TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 23 (2003-04); Michael M. Karayanni, On the Concept of ‘Ours’: Multiculturalism with Respect to Arab-
Jewish Context Relations, 27 TEL AVIV. U. L. REV. 71 (2003-04). 
125  HCJ 4438/97, Adalah. v. Ministry of Transp., 98 Takdim Elyon (1) 11 [1998] (Isr.).  
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Arabic on signs posed a safety hazard to the general public by denying Arabic speakers signage that they 
could read quickly in order to avoid traffic accidents and needless speeding.126 
The State’s counterclaims were of practical, not principled nature; however, they stood to have a 
substantial impact. The State argued that the addition of Arabic to all road signs would clutter them with 
a “forest” of words and serve to confuse more than to assist drivers. To counter this claim, Adalah 
offered the results of research conducted on the matter, which demonstrated that signs bearing three 
languages were equally as effective as signs with two languages. In a hearing that took place at the end of 
1998, the Supreme Court ordered the State to develop a timeframe shorter than five to seven years, as 
the State had proposed, in which to add the Arabic translations of the nation’s road signs. In February 
1999, the State committed to adding Arabic to all of the country’s road signs within a five-year period.127 
Although Arabic translations have been added to thousands of signs across the country since the 
Supreme Court decision, to this day the State has yet to fully implement the decision by adding Arabic to 
all of the signs. Furthermore, as in the previous Adalah case discussed above, inaccuracies and negligent 
spellings have been found on numerous signs, and the organization is forced to continually monitor the 
implementation of the judgment.128 
What perhaps renders this reality even more harmful to the realization of the Palestinian-Arab 
minority’s linguistic rights is the dynamic that has resulted from the line of litigation exemplified by the 
cases above—a dynamic in which the State and local municipalities are aware that full, timely, and 
meaningful implementation of the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court on this topic is not 
necessary because the consequences are negligible, if they exist at all. Moreover, there is no adequate way 
of ensuring that the substance and spirit of the judgments—beyond the technical face value of their 
instructions—are implemented. This is the result of overly broad wording employed by the Supreme 
Court justices and their leniency with state and municipal actors who delay or evade full translation of 
the judgments into action. 
C. Allocation of Material Resources 
 
1. Normative Framework 
The “transformative” approach to group equality not only focuses on formal discrimination, but 
also on the lasting material discrimination suffered by the minority. Material discrimination refers to the 
ways that discrimination and exclusion economically and culturally subordinate minority groups to the 
majority and subordinate the life chances of the minority to those of the majority in almost every sphere 
of life.129 Accordingly, although a narrow approach to group rights might succeed in eliminating the 
formal manifestations of group discrimination (a substantial achievement for many minority members), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126  In order to appreciate the extent of the danger, at the time the petition was filed, less than 20% of all road 
signs included Arabic. Id.; see also The Use of Arabic on National Road Signs, ADALAH, http://adalah.org/eng/Articles/618/ 
The-Use-of-Arabic-on-National-Road-signs-. The remaining road signs were posted in Hebrew with English translations 
only.  The only signs on which Arabic did appear were those located near Palestinian-Arab towns. Id. 
127  Id. 
128  In the course of litigating the case, it was discovered that only 3.5% of the National Roads Company’s 
employees were Arab, of whom less than a quarter were employed full time. It was also discovered that there was not a 
single Arab member of the company’s management, and among 174 engineers only one was Arab. As a result, Adalah 
added this issue to the demands of the case and to this day continues to push for increased hiring of Arabs in the 
company. 
129  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988). 
48 The Politics of Equality Vol. 4:1 
its short reach ultimately allows the perpetuation of conditions of material subordination of the minority 
group.130 
Minorities’ need for an equitable distribution of resources—including in relation to identity 
preservation—is supported by international law.131 Article 5.1 of the 1992 Declaration on Minorities 
stipulates that “national policies and programs shall be planned and implemented with due regard for the 
legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.”132 In his Commentary on the Declaration on 
Minorities, minority rights expert Professor Asbjørn Eide notes that the article should be read to include 
the distribution of such resources as public health, education, social security, housing, and other public 
welfare programs.133  
 
As a starting point, minorities require budgetary and other material resources proportional to 
their percentage of the population. However, in order for minority groups to achieve equal standing with 
majority groups, programs must expand the strict or formal definition of equality and distribution 
without discrimination into the realm of equity. Given that minority groups are often disproportionately 
disadvantaged socio-economically and have experienced long periods of deprivation and discrimination, 
principles of distributive and corrective justice often demand that extra measures and special allocations 
be undertaken in order to bring minorities to a status that is parallel to that of majority groups.134 
Affirmative action programs are only one of many ways to offer disadvantaged groups legitimate 
opportunities to progress and fully and equally enjoy the resources of a state.   
 
2. Case Study: Legal Action Regarding Allocations for Education 
 
The leading legal action brought in Israel regarding these principles relates to distribution of 
funding for education. In February 1998, the Israeli government adopted a program intended to advance 
education in Israel’s periphery. “Incentives in the areas of education and culture,” as the government 
decision stated, “were intended to improve the level of student achievement, with the aim of reducing 
the existing gaps between areas in the periphery and the center.”135 The classification of a town as 
bearing national priority status, as defined by the plan, entitled it, and the teachers in its schools, to a 
host of comprehensive and significant benefits and incentives.136 In order to determine who was eligible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  Jabareen, supra note 15, at 661-64. 
131  See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 10. Even General Comment 23 on Article 27 
makes clear that although the rights therein are articulated as negative rights, they also obligate states to take positive 
action to create conditions for their realization. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23: The Rights of 
Minorities, 50th Sess, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.21 (Apr. 8, 1994). 
132  Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 10, at art. 5.1. 
133  Asbjørn Eide, Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Working Group on 
Minorities, Rep. on its 4th Sess., May 25-29, 1998, art. 5.1 Commentary, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1998/WP.1 
(May 13, 1998).  
134  See The Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 10, art. 4; the ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 2. See 
also Patrick Thornberry, An Unfinished Story of Minority Rights, in DIVERSITY IN ACTION 47, 48 (A.M. Bíró, & P. Kovács 
eds., 2001). 
135  See Government Decision No. 3292, 15 February 1998, available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/about/Projects/ 
Documents/des3292.pdf. 
136  For example, incentives for teachers included a 75% reduction in tuition for teacher training, along with full 
reimbursement of transportation expenses, an 80% housing subsidy for teachers who reside in the same town in which 
they teach, and full coverage of teacher participation in payment for continuing education courses. On the municipal 
level this included, for example, full funding of the installation of computer systems in schools in Priority Area A and 
annual grants of 100,000 NIS (approximately $25,000 USD) “to encourage disadvantaged populations” for each 
community center in towns classified as Priority Area A. 
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for these incentives, the plan classified each town and city in Israel in one of three categories.137 Of the 
535 cities and towns that were granted priority, only four were Arab towns and all were of small 
populations. 
 
This program was viewed by the Palestinian-Arab community as particularly grievous given the 
poor state of Arab education as a whole in Israel. Indeed, on virtually every level—from achievement 
levels to drop out rates, to class size, to infrastructure, and most certainly in relation to funding—Arabs 
fare much worse than students in the Jewish education system.138 A report issued by a government-
appointed committee, the Or Commission,139 detailed many of the disparities between state investment 
in Jewish and Arab education.140   
Given this reality, even the most cursory examination of statistics revealed that the State’s claim 
that the selection of national priority areas was based on geographic and need-based considerations was 
unfounded. For example, if scholastic achievement in peripheral areas were a determining factor, then 
why were sixty-two towns from non-peripheral areas—the majority of which are predominantly 
Jewish—added to the 491 periphery towns granted extra support. Similarly, if the criteria were economic, 
determination of priority areas could have been in line with the State’s own yearly ranking system of the 
socio-economic situation of all towns in Israel conducted by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS).141 According to this recognized and accepted ranking system, the need for economic support is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Government Decision No. 3292, supra note 135. 
138  For more information, see Dirasat and Haifa University Law School Release a Report on the State of Arab Education 
in Israel, DIRASAT ARAB CTR. FOR LAW & POLICY (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.dirasat-aclp.org/index.asp?i=679 
(detailing the release of a research report which shows that the state of Arab-Palestinian education remains in a state of 
crisis as Arab-Palestinian students lag roughly 2.5 times behind their Jewish peers in academic achievement); see also Or 
Kashti, The Jewish Student Receives 5 Times As Many Enrichment Hours As the Arab Student, HA’ARETZ, Aug. 12, 2009 available 
at http://www.dirasat-aclp.org/Fact_Sheet-Education%5B1%5D.pdf (providing statistics on the disparities in education 
between the Arab and Jewish population). 
139  The “Or Commission,” or the “State Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes Between Security Forces and 
Israeli Civilians,” was appointed on November 15, 2000 by then Israeli Supreme Court President, Aharon Barak, one 
month after the tragic October 2000 events in which twelve Arab citizens and one resident of the Gaza Strip were killed 
at the hands of Israeli security forces. The public hearings, headed by then Israeli Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or, 
lasted two and a half years, from February 2001 to August 2003. The Commission’s report was released on September 2, 
2003. In a general sense, the report acknowledged the status of the Arab minority and critiqued the state’s approach; 
however, it failed to hold state officials explicitly accountable for the killings. Although no English translation of the Or 
Commission Report exists, a summary in English, prepared by the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz may be found on the 
Sikkuy website. See Official Summary Of the ‘Or’ Commission Report, First Or Watch Conference Proceedings, HA’ARETZ (June 24, 
2004), http://www.sikkuy.org.il/english/2004/OfficialSummary.pdf. 
140  The report stated that discrimination against Arab schools continued in many areas: the ratio of pupils per 
teacher, the number of students in each classroom, the number of suitable and functional classrooms, the existence of 
sports facilities and laboratories, the rate of computers per student, and more. The establishment of public kindergartens 
and public preschools for ages 3-4, special education, support programs, enrichment programs, professional education—
all of these significantly lagged behind the Jewish. Indeed, the state of Arab education on all levels is crying out for 
investment, a situation which is well-documented and known to all. 
141  Under the CBS system, each town in Israel is given a score from 1-10 based on a number of factors such as 
demographic data, education and academic performance levels, standards of living and income, certain features of the 
workforce, and the existence and amount of pensions. The CBS consistently places Palestinian-Arab local authorities 
among its lowest socio-economic rankings. Data for 2004 demonstrates that approximately 45% of Arab local councils 
rank in the two lowest clusters (one and two), and 97% are found in the four lowest clusters. Arab communities, as a 
whole, constitute more than 80% of the total towns and villages among the three lowest clusters. See Jabareen, supra note 
5, at 382-83. 
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greatest in Arab areas.142 Nonetheless, the final map used by the program did not appear to correspond 
with this ranking system, nor with the actual needs on the ground. 
Some three months after the program’s approval, Adalah filed a petition to the High Court of 
Justice on behalf of the Higher Follow-Up Committee on Arabs in Israel and the Higher Follow-Up 
Committee on Arab Education in Israel, challenging the decision to approve the particular set of national 
priority areas.143 The petition requested that the Court nullify the State’s decision on the grounds that it 
was based on invalid motivations, namely intentional and wrongful discrimination against the 
Palestinian-Arab population. Hearings on the petition continued for nearly eight years, during which 
time the decision remained in effect and the program continued to be implemented.  
Finally, on February 27, 2006, the Supreme Court rendered its decision.144 The justices, for the 
most part, accepted the petition’s claims of discrimination and ordered the nullification of the State’s 
decision within a year.145 In a lengthy and detailed opinion, Chief Justice Barak stated unequivocally the 
opinion of the Justices regarding the motivations of the ministers who had approved the “illegal 
decision.” Its illegality, he explained, was based on the fact that it “cannot be reconciled with the 
principle of equality” and because “its results lead to unlawful discrimination against the Arab sector in 
realizing its right to education.”146 The Court went on to hold that the discriminatory result alone was 
enough to invalidate the decision, regardless of its intent.147 
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the State’s decision must be invalidated. In consideration of 
the fact that the immediate cancellation of the decision would spur “complicated difficulties” within the 
education systems of the Jewish towns that had already planned their budgets based on the 
discriminatory decision, the Court decided to grant the State a grace period and stipulated that “the start 
of the cancellation of the government decision [would] be upon the passage of twelve months from the 
day of the rendering of this decision.”148 
However, the Ministry of Education seemed unable to adhere to this timeline or any timeline 
established by the Court.149 Following the initial twelve-month period, the State requested a six-month 
extension. As this date approached, the Ministry instead requested permission to implement the decision 
“gradually,” which, based on the wording of the request, seemed to indicate a four-year period. While the 
Court did not approve the request, it did grant an additional extension through June of 2008. On 
November 9, 2008, shortly after the extension had expired, the State Attorney’s Office announced that 
the State simply could not fulfill its obligation and the Court was called to hear explanations regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  The discriminatory character of the state’s decision on the classification of towns into priority areas can also 
be found by comparing two of the cities deemed Priority Area A, Natziral Illit and Migdal Ha’emek, with their eleven  
neighboring Palestinian-Arab towns, which were placed in the non-priority category. If the motive behind the 
classification had been geographic, then there would have been no reason to separate the first two Jewish cities from 
their eleven Arab neighboring towns; if the division had been based on socio-economic criteria, then there would be all 
the more reason to include the eleven Arab towns in the priority areas.  
143  HCJ 2773/98 Supreme Follow-Up Comm. et al. v. Prime Minister of Israel, amended and resubmitted as 
HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Follow-Up Comm., et. al. v. Prime Minister of Israel [2006] (Isr.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/630/111/a18/03111630.a18.pdf. 
144  HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Follow-Up Comm. et al. v. Prime Minister of Israel, Judgment [2006] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/630/111/a18/03111630.a18.pdf. For additional discussion on this 
case, see Segal, supra note 100, at 102-04. See also Karayanni, supra note 100, at 317 (summarizing the main issues 
addressed by the court and providing commentary on its impact for the Palestinian-Arab minority).  
145  Supreme Court Follow-Up Comm., supra note 144.  
146  Id. at para. 16. HCJ 11163/03, Judgment, Para. 16. 
147  Id. at paras. 18, 19. 
148  Id. at para. 28. 
149  Hesketh, supra note 53, at 23. 
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the State’s failure to implement the judgment. The petitioners requested that the Court hold the State in 
contempt of court. Instead, on behalf of the full panel of Justices, Chief Justice Beinisch ruled that the 
Court had:  
[N]o alternative but to point out that the issue before us is a grave expression of the 
liberty that the respondents have taken upon themselves in not implementing this 
Court’s decision. While the respondents were required to implement the ruling given by 
the Court, they have behaved as if it were a recommendation that may be respected 
according to their own determination of their priorities.”150  
Nonetheless, the Court obligated the State to implement the judgment during the academic year 
of 2009-10. In December of 2009, the State proposed a new map of national priority areas. It included 
some 1.164 million Jews and 882,000 Arabs (the latter representing approximately 43% of those who 
reside in the updated national priority areas and 72% of all Arabs in Israel).151 The Priority Areas Law, 
enacted in June of 2009 as part of the Economic Arrangements Law for the years 2009-10, stipulates that 
all prior government decisions on the topic of priority areas, including the discriminatory government 
decision on benefits and incentives in the area of education, will remain in effect for a period of two and 
a half years from the date of the new law’s enactment.152 According to this new law, the government 
decision that was nullified by the Supreme Court in February 2006 may remain in effect until January 
2012. Despite the seemingly more objective criteria contained in the new law, an appropriate remedy for 
the state of Palestinian-Arab education is far from guaranteed. A gaping loophole written into the law 
leaves final authority for distribution of the funds to the relevant ministries responsible for any given 
budgetary allocation. Thus, implementation depends, to a certain extent, upon the ‘good-will’ of these 
ministers and will require constant monitoring. Irrespective of the Priority Areas Law, implementation of 
the decision has yet to take place.   
The clear and dismal bottom line is that this illegal and discriminatory government decision has 
remained in place for over fifteen years. What is more, the plan continued to be implemented indefinitely 
following an unequivocal Supreme Court ruling that ordered its cancellation. Even if the State were to 
implement the judgment today and put into place a fair and equal plan, the new distribution would not 
compensate Arab students for the budget allocations of which they were unlawfully deprived during the 
more than decade and a half over which the original program was in place and the judgment went 
unimplemented. Instituting true equality in the distribution of priority areas requires affirmative action 
for Arab towns in order to compensate Arab students for past discrimination, such as the type 
contemplated by the Supreme Court in the political representation case discussed earlier. 
Beyond its specific failures, the national priority areas case represents a systemic and profound 
failure regarding the equitable distribution of material resources. While the decision upholds Israeli 
constitutional principles of equality in the realm of material resources, and even though the Court 
condemned the discriminatory result of the plan (regardless of its intentions), it failed to recognize 
collective Palestinian rights, or their right as a group to a status comparable to that of the Jewish 
population. Furthermore, even the basic individual right to equality was not upheld in practice, as the 
judgment has yet to be fully implemented. For all of these reasons, the outcome of this case on both the 
legal and practical levels represents a particularly grave deprivation of the basic individual and group 
rights of the Palestinian-Arab minority.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150  Supreme Court Follow-Up Comm., supra note 144, at para. 8. 
151  As calculated by Michal Belikof from the Sikkuy organization, January 2010. 
152  Sawsan Zaher, On Institutionalized Discrimination in the Implementation of High Court Decisions, ADALAH NEWSL. 
ISSUE NO. 63 (Adalah, Haifa, Isr.), August 2009, available at http://adalah.org/features/education/Sawsan _No 
_Implementation_article_English%5B1%5D.pdf. 
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3. Case Study: Legal Action Regarding Allocation for Christian and Muslim 
Cemeteries 
A case concerning the allocation of budgets for Christian and Muslim cemeteries based on a 
percentage-of-the-population criterion serves as yet another example of an Israeli Supreme Court 
judgment lacking the necessary teeth to compel implementation.153 In early 1999, the Adalah 
organization petitioned the High Court of Justice claiming that two clauses of the 1999 Budget Law were 
unconstitutional because they allocated funding for only Jewish cemeteries (over $4 million USD 
annually), while neglecting Arab Muslim, Christian, and Druze cemeteries entirely. Adalah demanded 
that the Ministry of Religious Affairs establish patently non-discriminatory criteria for the distribution of 
the funds to the cemeteries of all four sects. 
In a lengthy decision, the Court held that the Ministry must distribute the funds according to a 
proportionality test, based on each sector’s percentage of the population. The Court made grandiose 
statements about true implementation of the principle of equality. Justice Zamir, writing on behalf of the 
Court, stated: 
The resources of the State, whether in land or money, as well as other resources, belong 
to all citizens, and all citizens are entitled to benefit from them in accordance with the 
principle of equality, without discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender or 
other illegitimate consideration.  
 
The principle of equality must also guide the legislative authority, which too, like any 
other authority in the State, must act as a fiduciary to the public in accord with the basic 
values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, which include equality. . . . 
 
Such discrimination, particularly if it is methodical, may cause very severe damage, not 
only to a specific person or a specific entity, but also to the social fabric and the feeling 
of partnership which is a pre-condition for proper living in community. In any event, 
such discrimination is illegitimate at its core, from both a moral as well a legal 
perspective.154 
 
Again, however, the State (here the Ministry of Religious Affairs) stalled implementation and the 
petitioners were forced to file a motion after the judgment had already been rendered, in which they 
demanded that the Court intervene and order the Ministry to implement the decision in its 2001 budget. 
The Ministry claimed that the funds were set aside and that the relevant Palestinian-Arab municipalities 
and other bodies need only apply in order to receive them.155 Yet as of this writing, over a decade after 
said claim was made, the funding has yet to be transferred to the relevant bodies charged with 
Palestinian-Arab cemeteries of the various sects. 
 
In fact, the above cases can be added to a long list of rulings concerning allocation of public 
budgets to the Arab community, rendered by the Supreme Court in the last decade, that have never been 
fully implemented by the State.156 Two salient examples are the case that secured a plan of gradual 
allocation from the education budget for the purpose of implementing the “Shahar” educational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153  HCJ 1113/99 Adalah v. Minister for Religious Affairs 54(2) 164 [2000] (Isr.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/99/130/011/i13/99011130.i13.pdf. 
154  Id. at para. 3. 
155  See Equal Funding for Arab Religious Cemeteries, ADALAH, http://www.adalah.org/eng/Articles/674/Equal-
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enrichment programs in Arab towns and villages within five years, which has not yet been put into 
practice;157 and the case concerning the urban neighborhood rehabilitation (“Shikum Skhunot”) program 
that resulted in a significant reduction in a number of localities where the program operates, rather than 
it being expanded to Arab towns.158 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to demonstrate that despite a number of positive rulings in favor of 
the advancement of Palestinian-Arab rights, the Supreme Court in Israel has failed in its attempts to 
grant this minority the full range of collective rights they seek. Notwithstanding the intent of the Court 
on the practical and rhetorical levels and, in some cases, operationally, the results were very far from 
what the justices and petitioners seemingly envisioned. Clearly, the State demonstrated a lack of interest 
in implementing the Court’s judgments; however, the Court also failed to use all of the tools at its 
disposal to ensure that the spirit of its rulings would be translated into action on the ground.   
This oversight on the part of the Court appears even more negligent—and perhaps even 
deliberate—as more and more cases regarding Palestinian-Arab minority rights were heard before the 
Court and resulted in lack of implementation. As aforementioned, the Israeli High Court of Justice has a 
wealth of procedural and substantive options available, including issuing temporary injunctions and stays 
of execution; leaving cases open on the docket; ordering regular updates from the parties; and playing 
the role of implementation supervisor. As a pattern began to emerge, in which the State was reluctant to 
implement the Court’s judgments, either within a timely manner, according to their full meaning, or at 
all, it was up to the Court to take more pro-active measures in order to fully enforce its judgments. For 
instance, in the ACRI case regarding representation on the Israel Land Council, the Court might have 
ordered consultation with various leaders of the Palestinian-Arab community prior to the appointment 
of Council members in order to ensure that the appointments would be effective and truly 
representative, despite their low number (two of the twenty-four members). In the cases regarding 
adding the Arabic language to signposts in municipalities and on national road signs, the Court could 
have ordered consultation with Arabic language professionals prior to finalizing the text that would be 
added to ensure its linguistic and cultural accuracy and avoid the mockery made of the Court’s decision 
and the case’s petitioners. Given all of these previous experiences, in the most recent principled ruling 
regarding budget allocations for education the Court could have implemented better judicial oversight 
over the State. It could have issued an interim injunction to freeze the funds allocated for the program, 
or it could have exhibited less latitude in granting the State extensions to implement its decision. All of 
these areas of leniency weakened the strong statements made by the justices, belittled the importance of 
the issue among the Palestinian-Arab population, and diluted the resultant outcome. 
Of course, the Court does not operate in a vacuum. It faces social, political, and other external 
influences that constrain its authority, limit its ability to maneuver and temper its impact. It seems, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157  HCJ 2814/97 The Follow-Up Comm. for Arab Educ. v. The Ministry of Educ. 54 P(3) PD 233 [2000] 
(Isr.). In the 1970s, the Ministry of Education launched academic enrichment programs designed to help socio-
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in the Jewish educational system and thus have excluded all Arab schools. This exclusion contradicted the fact that 
Palestinian communities rank at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, according to all official statistical and 
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example, that public opinion, and certainly the stance of the legislative and executive branches, are not 
yet ready for implementation of full civil rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority. Indeed, the limited 
outcome of seemingly groundbreaking decisions reflects unwillingness, at this stage, on the part of the 
public and the State to create a situation of true, substantive equality between majority and minority 
groups. Beyond legal action, much groundwork still needs to be laid among the Israeli public and its 
officials in order for the Court’s decisions to have any meaningful effect. 
Nevertheless, the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, like minorities in other countries, has 
limited avenues for seeking justice. As was discussed above, prejudice against Palestinian-Arabs in Israel 
distorts the Israeli political process as described by Professor John Hart Ely’s process-oriented theory,159 
thereby reducing any chance of making headway via the political channels.   
The disadvantaged status of minority groups vis-à-vis both the public and elected officials, and 
their accompanying distress, should trigger the courts to apply both stricter review and heightened 
sensitivity to the minority’s position in society when reviewing government actions in cases that relate to 
such groups. Such acute awareness, alongside a critical examination of government actions, should be 
aimed at providing redress for political injury caused to minorities, correcting existing injustices in 
government systems and agencies,160 and creating a framework for wider change. 
Unfortunately, however, the Israeli Supreme Court views its role narrowly. An analysis of the 
rulings discussed in this article indicates that Supreme Court Justices are more concerned with a strict 
interpretation of the law than with being at the vanguard of a broader process of social change. While 
more favorable decisions promoting equality could have been made without creating undue legal or 
institutional upheaval, the justices were seemingly reluctant to use their authority and discretion to 
protect the rights of the Palestinian-Arab minority as a group. In light of the inequality inherent in the 
system, it is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to use its authority to protect those disenfranchised by 
the system.   
Even where political and grassroots advocacy are necessary to engendering sustainable change, 
bold and deliberate action by the courts is a necessary piece of the puzzle that will ensure that each and 
every citizen benefits from their most basic right to equality before the law. The courts must engage in 
proactive strategies and use the full strength of the law—along with all of the legal tools available to 
them—to promote and guarantee group-based equality for national minority groups. They must lead the 
call for change by taking a more active approach in promoting immediate and effective outcomes and by 
serving as a watchdog for recalcitrant government authorities that stand in the way of social 
transformation. One can only hope that the courts in Israel and elsewhere will adopt new, wide-ranging 
and transformative visions, which will help to engender real change in the lives of national minorities. It 
seems that creating social transformation requires a shift in public opinion, whereby there is broad-based 
agreement on the mutual benefit of advancing the status of the minority in order to advance society as a 
whole. An increase in judicial “robustness” and a willingness to adapt the law to such a shift is also 
required. Ultimately, only this attitudinal shift accompanied with an attendant change in the laws will lead 
to the realization of both individual and collective minority rights in Israel and elsewhere. 
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